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Summary:
Since its inception, GNSS (Global Navigation Satellite System) have become more popular year after year. GNSS
is currently used in a wide variety of applications beyond the determination of the user position by means of a
GNSS receiver. GNSS is used in sectors as different as finance, energy distribution or telecommunications. Due
to this increase in popularity in the last years, GNSS has become objective of attacks, with the purpose of control
the victim receiver and provide an erroneous PVT (Position, Time and Velocity) solution. In first place, in this
document are described the basic concepts of GNSS, this means describe the elements that composes GNSS and
how the PVT solution is determined by the receiver. Once are shown the basic concepts of GNSS, the attacks are
presented. The state-of-the-art of the attacks against GNSS is described, with the objective of showing the wide
variety of possibilities there are available. Next are explained in detail the SCER (Security Code Estimation and
Replay) attacks based on the estimation of the impracticable bits. For this attack, are proposed three different
strategies, two of them based on modifying the signal at chip level and a third one based on the modification of
the bit amplitude, and four detection methods. Once there has been explained in detail in what consist each of
them, a comparison of the different attacks and detection methods are carried out in order to determine which
attack is the best (from the point of view of the attacker) and which detection method is more effective against
each attack strategy.
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Resum:
Des dels seus inicis, els sistemes de posicionament global per sate`l·lit, o del angle`s GNSS (Global Navigation
Satellite System), han guanyat popularitat any rere any. Actualment, aquests sistemes so´n emprats en un gran
nu´mero d’aplicacions, me´s enlla` de determinar la posicio´ del usuari mitjanc¸ant un receptor de GNSS. Actualment
GNSS es utilitzat en sectors molt diversos com podrien ser les finances, la distribucio´ d’energia o les telecomuni-
cacions. Degut a aquest augment en popularitat en els darrer anys, els sistemes GNSS s’han convertit en objectiu
d’atacs, amb la fi de controlar el receptor de la v´ıctima i aix´ı proporcionar una solucio´ PVT (Posicio´, Velocitat
i Temps) erro`nia. En primer lloc, en aquest document es descriuen els conceptes ba`sics dels sistemes GNSS, e´s
a dir, quins elements els componen i com es determina la solucio´ PVT en el receptor. Una vegada mostrades les
bases dels sistemes GNSS, s’introdueixen els atacs. La descripcio´ dels atacs comenc¸a amb un resum de l’estat de
l’art dels tipus d’atacs contra els sistemes GNSS, amb l’objectiu de mostrar la gran varietat de possibilitats que
n’hi han. Seguidament, es detallen els atacs de tipus SCER (del angle`s Security Code Estimation and Replay)
basats en l’estimacio´ dels bits impredictibles. Per aquest tipus d’atacs es proposen tres estrate`gies d’atac, dues de
les quals basades en la modificacio´ del senyal a nivell de chip i una tercera basada en modificar l’amplitud del bit,
i quatre me`todes de deteccio´. Una vegada detallat en que consisteixen cadascuna de les estrate`gies i els me`todes
de deteccio´, es realitza una comparacio´ amb l’objectiu de determinar quin atac e´s millor (des del punt de vista
del atacant) i quin me`tode de de deteccio´ e´s me´s efectiu contra cadascuna de les estrate`gies d’atac.
Resumen:
Desde sus inicios, los sistemas de posicionamiento global por sate´lite, o del ingle´s GNSS (Global Navigation
Satellite System), han ido ganando popularidad an˜o tras an˜o. En la actualidad, estos sistemas son usados en
un gran nu´mero de aplicaciones, mas alla´ de solamente determinar la posicio´n del usuario mediante un receptor
de GNSS. Actualmente GNSS es usado en sectores tan diversos como las finanzas, la distribucio´n de energ´ıa o
las telecomunicaciones. Debido a este aumento en popularidad en los u´ltimos an˜os, los sistemas GNSS se han
convertido en objetivo de ataques, con el fin de tomar el control del receptor de la v´ıctima y as´ı proporcionar
una solucio´n PVT (Posicio´n, Velocidad y Tiempo) erro´nea. En primer lugar, en este documento se describen
los conceptos ba´sicos de los sistemas GNSS, es decir, que los componen y como se determina la solucio´n PVT
en el receptor. Tras conocer las bases de funcionamiento de los sistemas GNSS, se introducen los ataques. En
un primer momento se describe el estado del arte de los ataques contra los sistemas GNSS, con el objetivo de
mostrar la gran variedad de ataques que se pueden llevar a cabo. Tras esto, se detallan los ataques de tipo SCER
(del ingles Security Code Estimation and Replay) basados en la estimacio´n de los bits impredecibles. Para este
tipo de ataques se proponen tres estrategias de ataque, dos de las cuales basadas en la modificacio´n de la sen˜al a
nivel de chip y una tercera basada en la modificacio´n de la amplitud del bit, y cuatro me´todos de deteccio´n. Tras
detallar en que consiste cada una de las estrategias y los me´todos de deteccio´n, se realiza una comparacio´n con el
objetivo de determinar que ataque es mejor (desde el punto de vista del atacante) y que me´todo de deteccio´n es
mas efectivo contra cada uno de las estrategias de ataque.
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1 Introduction
In the last few decades, Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) have become an indispens-
able element in our society. Currently, they are not only used to determine the user position, but
they are used in a wide variety of sectors and situations, such as energy distribution (e.g. The
power grid monitors), finance (e.g. The automated stock trading systems), transportation (e.g.
Train monitoring or ) or telecommunications (e.g. The cell phone towers). Due to their gain
in popularity, GNSS have become target of attacks of diverse nature and motivations. Starting
from knocking o↵ the service that provides GNSS, until manipulating the GNSS signals to the
attacker interests in order to cheat the PVT (Position, Velocity and Timing) solution. The
consequences of such attacks could be disastrous, since critical infrastructures in key sectors of
the economy rely partially or entirely on GNSS to its correct functioning.
Throughout the last years, the concern about GNSS spoofing has increased. One of the
reasons is due to the availability of inexpensive programmable signal simulators that can be
used to mount an attack. There are already available software-defined GPS signal simulators,
such as one publicly posted in GitHub in 2015 [OSQ15]. This software can be downloaded
and run on a wide number of general-purpose COTS (commercial-o↵-the-Shelf) RF generation
platforms. The cost of these platforms is relatively cheap, and can be acquired for less than five
thousand Dollars. These devices have already been tested, and have been verified that they can
e↵ectively work as a spoofer against a standard civil GPS receivers.
In the last few years, several attacks against GNSS have been documented. Some of these
attacks were under controlled circumstances, and with an educational purpose. For example:
1. The capture and control of a drone [Ker14]. They took the control of a drone from forcing
it to reacquire the satellites, and interposing counterfeit GPS signals. Once the drone was
acquired the fake satellites, they had total control of the aircraft. They could drive it at
any place chosen by the attackers, and the drone showed the expected position in which
he should be located.
2. The steering of a yacht o↵ its course [Bha17]. In this occasion, they took the control of a
yacht by generating counterfeit GPS signals and forcing the yacht to acquire them. Once
1
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they took the control of the watercraft, they could drive the yacht at any place they want,
and the victim will not appreciate any deviation of established direction by the legitimate
user.
There are also some other reported attacks with a non-educational or malicious purpose. For
example:
1. The capture of a CIA drone by the Iranian military forces [DB11].
2. Jamming on the Korean peninsula carried out, supposedly, by the North Korea’s regime
[Sta12].
3. Spoofing in the Kremlin bordering area carried out, presumably, by the Russian Govern-
ment [Seb16].
4. Or the most recent attack in the black sea reported by the USA government in which some
ships were situated incorrectly over 32 km away from the true position [Gof17].
1.1 Motivation
The main focus of this thesis is showing that attacks against GNSS are real and a possible
threat. Since they are feasible, a constant threat exists against GNSS systems and the dependant
subsystems. Since the kinds of attacks against GNSS can be enormously wide, and they can
exploit di↵erent vulnerabilities of GNSS, this document is centred on the SCER attacks, based
on the unpredictable bits. Thus, the main objective of this document is showing that SCER
attacks against GNSS are possible, specifically the based on unpredictable bits estimation, and
are a feasible threat. The second objective of this thesis is to show that some techniques that
can be used to detect the attacks.
1.2 Methodology
To obtain the results of this thesis, the work has been based on MATLAB and GNSS signals.
The signals are recorded from authentic satellites, and created synthetically with a signal gen-
erator. The recorded signals have been useful to obtain the results based on real data. So the
methodology of this thesis can be divided in the following steps:
1. Record the GNSS signals from real satellites. These records were previously recorded at
UAB some time ago (July 2014). The signals were recorded at the faculty of Veterinary
and at the faculty of Engineering.
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2. With an existing Software-Receiver 1 developed in MATLAB the acquisition and tracking
data of the recorded signals has been performed. So with this software receiver has been
obtained the main parameters of the GNSS signals, such as the code delay or the Doppler
frequency.
3. The attacks were performed with an existing Signal Generator 2 modified properly. From
the tracking results obtained in step 2, the appropriate modifications were performed to a
generated signal with the Signal Generator. As a result, a GNSS signal with no superficial
di↵erences compared with the originally recorded was obtained. But, this signal had an
spoofer attack under the surface. Both signals the authentic and spoofer gave the same
PVT solution, which demonstrates that they were almost the same signal, since the code
delays were not modified.
4. Finally, some Matlab scripts to implement the spoofer detection techniques were developed.
With these scripts the detection results were obtained.
1.3 Thesis Outline
In Chapter 1 an overview and some examples of applications of GNSS is introduced. In Chapter
1 some examples of GNSS attacks providing the references are given.
In Chapter 2 some GNSS fundamentals are introduced, focused above all in GPS and Galileo.
In this chapter will also be given a few brush-strokes about GNSS history, among other things
the segments in which they are composed and a brief comparison between the current deployed
positioning systems. Next the GNSS signals will be described, focused on the GPS and Galileo
signals. After that the Navigation Data of GPS will also be described. Finally, the receiver
architecture and the positioning principle of GNSS will be explained.
In Chapter 3 the state-of-the-art about GNSS attacks is summarized. We will describe its
general features, focusing the attention on the signal modifications. Then we will describe some
countermeasures against these attacks, which are divided in encryption and non-encryption
defence methods. Then, we will explain in what consists the Unpredictable Bit Estimation
Attacks, which in fact is the main focus of this thesis. After describing the signal model and the
main features of the purposed attacks, the authentic and counterfeit signals will be compared.
Tp end this chapter we will carry out a simulation about the estimation performance of the
symbol estimation depending on the level of noise in the signal.
In Chapter 4 the purposed detection methods against the Unpredictable Bit Estimation
Attacks are described. Two methods are taken into account, showing its main features and also
1GPS Software Receiver in Matlab, Copyright (c) 2003-2013 David S. De Lorenzo
2Copyright (c) 2004-8 David S. De Lorenzo
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describing its main actions.
In Chapter 5 the results obtained after apply the detection methods described in Chapter 4
against the Unpredictable Bit Estimation Attack strategies proposed in Chapter 3 are summa-
rized. We analyse these results in order to verify that the spoofer tell-tale can be detected, and
in what circumstances they can be detected.
Finally, in Chapter 6 the conclusions of this thesis are shown, based mainly on the results
obtained in Chapter 5.
2 GNSS Fundamentals
2.1 Introduction
In ancient civilizations, positioning was based on the observation of celestial objects. To deter-
mine the position and the course, the travellers path was based on the position of the moon,
sun, stars and other celestial bodies in a determined time of the day. These celestial bodies
were the unique reference the travellers had when they travelled in isolated places as the sea or
deserts. But they were not always visible (due to clouds, trees, etc.). Nowadays, the positioning
and navigation discipline has su↵ered a striking evolution. This change has been lead by the
discovery and use of radio-frequency signals. This advance in radio-frequency signals has lead us
to the implementation of the Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) we can use nowadays
placing artificial satellites in the space that are always visible (in terms of operation, there are
always some of them visible in any place). These satellites based on radio-frequency are useful
even when bad weather conditions occur, unlike with the celestial bodies used in the old days.
GNSS has military origins, as most of the current telecommunication systems currently used,
such as the RADAR. In the early 1960s the U.S. Navy’s navigation satellite system (also known
as Transit) was launched to help the navigation of U.S. submarines. Its functioning was based
on the Doppler e↵ect, and it was composed by 5 or more satellites in a low polar orbit. With
this system was required about one hour to determine the position. Transit soon became widely
adopted by commercial marine navigators, and it was the precursor of the current NAVSTAR
Global Position System (GPS). The soviet union also developed its own version of Transit. It
was called TSIKADA. A few years later, in 1970s, GPS was developed by the U.S. Department
of Defence. It took over 20 years to make it fully operational. It was composed by a constellation
of nominally 24 satellites with accurate on-board clocks, spread-spectrum signals with pseudo-
random codes and multiple carrier frequencies. At the same time the Soviet Union also developed
its own GNSS system. It was called GLONASS. Currently, other countries and regions have also
developed or are currently developing its own global or regional navigation systems such as Japan
(QZSS), China (Beidou, or the second version called COMPASS, which is still in development) or
India (IRNSS). In 2002 started the development of Galileo, the European GNSS system, which
5
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will be fully operational in 2020 (although it is already functional). Complementary to GNSS,
augmentation satellite systems has been developed. This complementary systems are based on
a geostationary earth orbit (GEO) constellation of satellites that co-work with GNSS. They
are mainly, but not only used for aviation. The most important are: WAAS (U.S.), EGNOS
(Europe), MSAS (Japan), or SDCM (Russia).
In the present chapter we will introduce the GNSS fundamentals, in particular GPS fun-
damentals. Although most of the explanations can be extrapolated to the other GNSS such
as Galileo. This fundamentals of GNSS will be specially important to understand the attacks
described in Chapter 3. In Section 2.2 the principle of operation and the system architecture of
GNSS is explained, focused mainly on GPS and Galileo. In Section 2.3 the signals that compose
GPS and Galileo are explained. In Section 2.4 some details about the blocks that composes most
of GPS receivers are given. Finally, in Section 2.5 we explain the principle by which the user
position is determined. The present chapter is mainly based in references [Kap06] and [PM06].
2.2 GNSS Architecture
In this Section the architecture of the currently deployed GNSS is described. GNSS is composed
basically by three segments: The Space Segment, The Control Segment and The User Segment.
The Space Segment comprises the satellites in the space and the Control Segment deals with the
management of the satellite operations. On its behalf the User Segment covers the equipment
required (e.g. receivers). Therefore, each of the segments has a determined role in the resulting
PVT (Position, Velocity and Time) solution. In Figure 2.1 the three segments that compose
any GNSS are depicted.
USER SEGMENT
(US)
GROUND CONTROL SEGMENT
(GCS)
SPACE SEGMENT
(SS)
Commercial
Military
Master
Control
Station
Monitor
Station
Ground
Antenna
Figure 2.1: GNSS Segments in GPS (Image taken from [ER17]).
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2.2.1 Space Segment (SS)
The SS is composed by the total set of satellites (between 24 and 30, depending on the GNSS
considered) placed in a determined orbit around the earth. The satellites are placed in the MEO
(Medium Earth Orbit) orbit, between 19000 and 24000 km of altitude. This altitude depends
on the considered GNSS. The period (the time it takes the satellite to give a complete orbit
cycle) is between 11 to 14 hours. The set of satellites are arranged in 3 or 6 orbital planes. In
Table 2.1 are summarized the SS for the most common GNSS.
With the set of satellites placed around the earth, almost all users with a clear view of
the sky have a minimum of 4 satellites in view. Usually the user has more in view, given the
interoperability of some GNSS, such as GPS and Galileo, which are interoperable at system
level. The satellites broadcast the ranging signals and navigation data to the user equipment,
which allows to measure their pseudoranges and determine their position. The communication
is unidirectional, the user receiver is passive (only receives the broadcast signal and do not
transmit any).
COMPASS GLONASS Galileo GPS Constellation	
3
21528 km 19100 km 23222 km 20200 km Altitude	
China Russia Europe USA Country	
27243024
Number	of	
Satellites	
6Orbital	Plane	
12 h 38 min 11 h 15 min 14 h 12 h Period	
Table 2.1: GNSS Space Segment comparison.
2.2.2 Control Segment (CS)
The CS is composed by a set of control stations located in di↵erent places of the earth. The
control stations in GPS are divided in the Master Control Station (MSC) and Monitor Station
(MS). In GPS the MCS is placed in Schriever, in an AIR Force Base near Colorado Springs
(Colorado). This MCS is responsible of operate the system, and provide command and control
functions. The specific functions are:
• Monitor the satellite orbits.
• Monitor and maintain the satellite health.
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• Maintain GPS time.
• Predict satellite ephemerides and clock parameters.
• Update satellite navigation messages.
• Command small orbit corrections on the satellites, in order to compensate possible non-
alignments in the orbit.
The MS’s of GPS are composed by a set of stations spread around the earth. The monitor
stations are operated remotely by the MSC. The MS’s are responsible of:
• Watching and monitoring each satellite.
• Receiving telemetry from the satellites of their status.
• Uplinking commands to the satellites.
• Uploading the data to update the navigation messages that will be broadcast by the
satellites (at least once a day).
Some monitor stations (located in Ascension, Diego Garcia and Kwajalein) are equipped
with GPS receivers, meteorological instruments and a dedicated communications infrastructure
to transmit its measurements to the MSC or the satellites.
On its behalf, the Galileo control segment consists of two Galileo Control Centres (GCC)
situated in Oberpfa↵enhofen (Germany) and Fucino (Italy). Each one of the GCC has di↵erent
tasks:
• The one based in Fucino is called Ground Mission Segment (GMS), and it determines
the navigation and timing data part of the navigation messages by means of the network
of sixteen Galileo Sensor Stations (GSS). Each GSS collects and forwards the Galileo
measurements and data to the GCCs in real time
• The one based in Oberpfa↵enhofen is called Ground Control Segment (GCS), and it is re-
sponsible for the satellite constellation control and management of the di↵erent satellites.
It provides the telemetry, telecommand and control function by means of the Telemetry
Tracking and Control (TT&C) stations. These stations collect and forwards the teleme-
try data generated by the Galileo satellites. It also distributes and uplinks the control
commands to the satellites.
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2.2.3 User Segment (US)
The US consists of the user receivers. Their main function is to receive the GNSS signals,
determine the pseudoranges, and solve the navigation equations in order to determine the PVT
solution. The basic elements of the most common GNSS Receivers are: an antenna with pre-
amplification, an L-band radio frequency section, a microprocessor, an intermediate-precision
oscillator, a feeding source, some memory for data storage and an interface with the user.
2.3 GNSS Signals
2.3.1 GPS Signal Architecture
Each GPS satellite transmits in three di↵erent L-band frequencies, between 1 GHz and 2 GHz.
In particular, the GPS frequencies are:
• L1: fL1 = 1575.42MHz,
• L2: fL2 = 1227.60MHz,
• L5: fL5 = 1176.45MHz,
On L1 two signals are transmitted, one for civil use and other for the USA Department-
of-Defence authorised users. On L2 is only transmitted the Department-of-Defence authorised
users signal. The L5 band is used to provide a means of radio-navigation secure and robust
enough for life critical applications, such as aircraft precision approach guidance. This section
will be focused in L1 and L2 bands.
The GPS signals consists on three components:
• A Carrier: It is a Radio Frequency sinusoidal that supports the signal information at a
determined frequency bands (the frequencies L1, L2 or L5). This frequency bands are
chosen to limit the impact of the signal propagation channel (e.g. the attenuation due to
atmosphere) and to limit the size of antennas, since as lower is the frequency the waves
better in terms of attenuation, but the antennas needs to be bigger.
• The Ranging Code (or Spreading Code): It is a family of binary codes called pseudo-
random noise (PRN) sequences or simply PRN codes. These codes behaves statistically as
white noise. This means that the PRN codes are orthogonal between them, which means
that the cross-correlation (the correlation between two di↵erent PRN codes) is minimum
(zero), and the autocorrelation (The correlation between a certain PRN code with itself)
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is maximum (if both codes are perfectly aligned). This spreading codes allows the di↵erent
satellites to transmit at the same time and at the same frequency. Its transmissions will
be di↵erentiated by the spreading code used. These code also allows precise range mea-
surements, and mitigate most of the undesired e↵ects of reflections and interfering signals
received by a GPS antenna. The codes for the Standard Positioning Service (Civil use) are
called Coarse/Acquisition codes (C/A codes), and the codes for the Precise Positioning
Service are called Precision (encrypted) Codes (P(Y) codes). Each satellite transmits a
unique C/A code on L1 and an unique P(Y) code on both L1 and L2.
Each C/A code is composed by an specific sequence of 1023 bits (which are known as
chips). This sequence of chips is repeated each millisecond. Therefore, the rate of the
C/A Code (or Chipping rate) is 1.023 MHz (or Mega Chips/second).
The P(Y)-code is an extremely long (⇡ 1014 chips) PRN sequence, with a Chipping Rate
of 10.23 MHz (ten times greater than the C/A code). The P(Y)-codes are repeated once a
week. Currently, the satellites transmits the P(Y) code encrypted, and it is called Y-code.
• The Navigation Data: It is a message that contains the satellite health status, ephemeris
(satellite position and velocity), clock bias and almanac (a reduced-precision ephemeris).
The navigation message uses a BPSK (Binary Phase Shift Keying) modulation (in L1 and
L2 bands) and its bit rate is 50 bits per second, much smaller than the chipping rate of the
code. The bit duration is 20 ms, and it takes 12.5 minutes to receive an entire navigation
message.
The L1 and L2 signals leaving the k-th satellite described above can be modelled as
s
(k)
L1 (t) =
p
2PcC
(k)(t)D(k)cos(2pifL1tθL1)+
+
p
2PPL1P
(k)(t)D(k)sin(2pifL1t+ θL1),
s
(k)
L2 (t) =
p
2PPL2P
(k)(t)D(k)sin(2pifL2t+ θL2),
(2.1)
where Pc, is the signal power for the signal carrying the C/A code on L1; PPL1 and PPL2 are the
signal powers for signals carrying the P(Y) code on L1 and L2, respectively; C(k) and P (k) are
the C/A and P(Y) code sequences for the k-th satellite; D(k) is the navigation data for the k-th
satellite; fL1, fL2, θL1 and θL2 are the carrier frequencies and the phase o↵sets corresponding
to L1 and L2, respectively.
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2.3.2 Galileo Signal Design
One of the main characteristics of Galileo is its interoperability with GPS. Thus, its signals must
not interfere with the GPS signals. Galileo will provide three navigation signals (One of them
divided in two sub-bands) in the next frequencies:
• E1 band: fE1 = 1575.42 MHz,
• E5 band: fE5 = 1191.795 MHz,
• E5a band: fE5a = 1176.45 MHz,
• E5b band: fE5b = 1176.14 MHz,
• E6 band: fE6 = 1278.75 MHz,
2.4 Receivers Architecture
The main objective of GNSS receivers is to determine the user position based on the received
signals coming from the constellation of di↵erent satellites in view. Figure 2.2 shows the block
diagram of a typical GNSS receiver. It is basically composed of:
• Front-End: It is the first block, just after the GNSS antenna. It is typically composed
of a band-pass filter, a low-noise amplifier, a base-band converter and an analog-to-digital
converter (ADC). Thus, this module is the responsible for carrying out the analog signal
conditioning for the next blocks.
• Signal Processing Module: This block can be divided in two sub-blocks: the Acquisi-
tion Module and the Tracking Module. The aim of the Acquisition Module is to detect
and identify the satellites in view. On its behalf, the aim of the Tracking Module is to
track the variations on the acquired signals. More details about these two blocks are given
in Section 2.4.1 and Section 2.4.2.
• Navigation Module: The aim of the Navigation module is to solve the user PVT solu-
tion, based on the procedures presented in Section 2.5.
Looking at Figure 2.2 we observe that the bigger module, and in fact the most important
module, is the Signal Processing Module, which is divided in the Acquisition and Tracking mod-
ules. The aim of this module is to process the received signals for each satellite simultaneously,
demodulate the system data, generate reference PRN code for each signal and acquire and track
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the di↵erent satellite signals. The outputs of the Signal Processing Module are basically pseudo-
ranges, carrier phase measurements and the demodulated Navigation Message, which are used
by the Navigation Module to obtain the user PVT solution. In Sections 2.4.1 and 2.4.2 are
described the main two blocks of the Signal Processing Module.
2.4.1 Acquisition Module
At the output of the Front End Module, the GNSS signal has been conditioned for the acquisition
Module, whose main task is to detect the satellites that are present in the signal. The first
objective of the Acquisition Module is to determine the satellites present in the received signal,
and to calculate a rough estimate of the time-delay from the satellite to the receiver and the
Doppler shift of the available satellites. In order to do it, the correlation between the received
signal and the PRN code replica sequence generated in the receiver is performed. One correlation
by each satellite that composes the constellation is carried out. After this correlation, a set of
correlation values are obtained. To determine if the satellite is currently in view, a certain
threshold is declared. All the satellites whose correlation value is higher than a given threshold
are considered in view, and therefore acquired. On the contrary, if the correlation value is lower
than the threshold, the satellites are considered not in view, and hence are discarded. The
acquisition code-delay and Doppler shift estimates are those values where the magnitude of the
correlation gives the largest peak. This correlation peak is depicted at the top part of Figure 2.3.
This Figure shows the 3D representation of the correlation in both frequency and time domain.
Figure 2.3 shows as the biggest peak represents the Doppler frequency and delay of the acquired
satellite. There can be determined the code delay in chips and the Doppler shift in Hz. In the
bottom part is shown the correlation result in the time domain, which shows a clear peak that
determines the code delay of the acquired satellite.
2.4.2 Tracking Module
The main goal of the tracking module is to refine the time-delay and Doppler shift initial
estimates provided by the acquisition module, and to continuously track any change in any of
these values. Figure 2.4 shows the di↵erent blocks by which is composed the Tracking Module.
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Figure 2.2: General receiver architecture ([ER17]).
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Figure 2.3: Time-Frequency representation of the correlation peak during the acquisition process. At
the top is shown the Time-Frequency 3D correlation peak. At the bottom is shown the correlation result
that determines the code delay.
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It is divided in Code tracking and Carrier tracking loops. During the code tracking, the time-
delay of the replica PRN is refined and continuously tracked in order to be aligned with the
incoming code of the received signal. During the Carrier tracking any variation of the Doppler
frequency is refined and continuously tracked. This continuous track is performed by means of
the corresponding tracking loops. The loops are called Delay-Lock Loop (DLL) for the code-
delay tracking, and Phase-Lock Loop (PLL) for the carrier tracking.
Following the scheme shown in Figure 2.4, the Front-end output enters to the code tracking.
Particularly it enters to the Early-Late code tracking. The Early-Late code tracking shows
that three correlations are indeed performed for code tracking: One computed at the prompt
correlation (i.e. located at the code-delay estimate), and the other two located symmetrically
before and after the prompt one, which are called early and late correlators, respectively. This
kind of configuration leads to the early-late methods, where the discriminator output is obtained
by comparing in some way or another the early and late correlators. At the output of the DLL
discriminator are provided the estimation error values in the code-delay, which are introduced
to the DLL Loop Filter. In the DLL loop Filter the measurement from the DLL discriminator
is filtered with the aim of reducing the noise at the input of the NCO, and avoid instabilities.
At the output of the NCO (Numerical Controlled Oscillator) DLL is obtained the current code-
delay that must be introduced in the PRN Code Generator in order to generate an aligned copy
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Figure 2.4: General architecture of the tracking module of a typical GNSS receiver ([ER17]).
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of the PRN code. With this perfectly aligned copy of the code the receiver is able to despread
the incoming signal with no errors due to misalignments of the code (since if the code is not
perfectly aligned it behaves as if it were a di↵erent code).
On its behalf the Carrier tracking loop starts with the output of the prompt correlator.
This value enters to the PLL discriminator, which provides a measurable value of the Doppler
frequency error estimate. This value is introduced into the PLL Loop Filter, in order to filter the
noise and obtain an smoother version of the value. At the output of the PLL NCO is converted
the filtered discriminator output into a frequency that controls the generation of the local carrier
replica.
Nowadays there are more recent tracking schemes based on the use of adaptive Kalman Filter
techniques [LS16], providing better robustness compared to the conventional DLL/PLL-based
techniques described above under harsh environments.
2.5 Navigation Module: Positioning Principle
GPS positioning is based on distance measurements referred to as trilateration, when three
measurements are used, or multilateration, when more than three measurements are used. In
order to determine the user position in three dimensions at least four satellites (one satellite
for each unknown, three for coordinates and one for time) are needed, resulting in the following
system of equations
r(k) = c ·  t(k), (2.2)
where r(k) is the range distance between the k-th satellite and the user receiver, c is the speed
of light and  t(k) is the time it takes the signal to arrive to the user receiver from the k-th
satellite. Thus, the distance r(k) is computed by measuring the propagation time required for
the satellite ranging code to arrive to the user receiver antenna. The process of measuring this
propagation time is depicted in Figure 2.5.
In Figure 2.5 is shown the code generated by a certain satellite, starting in t1. At the
receiver, this code arrives at the time instant t2, with a certain delay due to propagation,
which is represented by  t. In the receiver, an identical code is generated at t (being the
receiver clock the time reference, not necessarily being t1). This replica code is shifted until
both replica codes are perfectly aligned (both codes are correlated, and when this correlation is
maximum means that both codes are aligned). If the satellite clock and the receiver clock were
perfectly synchronized, the correlation process would give us the true propagation time. The
problem is that the clocks of the satellite and the user receiver are not perfectly synchronized.
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The receiver clock will generally have a bias error from system time called τu, which is in
principle unknown. In addition, the satellite clock also has a certain error o↵set (even using
highly accurate atomic clocks), composed of bias (mainly due to the relativistic e↵ects) and
drift contributions, represented by τs. This τs is assumed that it is compensated, since the GPS
ground-monitoring network determines the required corrections and transmits it to the satellites,
which includes this information in the navigation message. So, the corrections are applied by
the user receiver and τs is compensated.
Due to the unknown error τu, the range found using Equation 2.2 is called pseudorange,
represented by ρ, which means that this is not the true range but quite similar. After obtaining
the pseudoranges for the k satellites, the position of the receiver can be determined using the
next system of equations
ρ(k) =
q
(x(k)   xu)2 + (y(k)   yu)2 + (z(k)   zu)2 + c · τu, (2.3)
where ρ(k) denotes the pseudorange for the k-th satellite, determined using Equation 2.2; where
(x(k), y(k), z(k)) denote the k-th satellite’s position in three dimensions; (xu, yu, zu) is the user
position; c is the speed of light; and τu is the user time o↵set (the time o↵set between the
receiver and satellites clocks). Being (xu, yu, zu) and τu the four unknowns to solve with these
equations. The satellites position (x(k), y(k), z(k)) are included in the navigation message (in
the ephemeris data), so it is not an unknown.
These non-linear equations can be solved for the unknowns by employing either closed-form
solutions, iterative techniques based on linearisation or Kalman Filter. From 2.3, the receiver
position is given in Cartesian coordinates. These Cartesian coordinates are transformed to
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Figure 2.5: Use of the replica code to determine the satellite code transmission time.
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geodetic coordinates; the geodetic system presents the location on the earth by its latitude,
longitude and height.

3 Attacks Against GNSS
There is a wide variety of possible attacks against GNSS. Nowadays there is not a clear classifi-
cation for them. A possible classification could be based on: The motivation of the attack (if it
tries to deny the GNSS service or tries to impersonate the real satellite), the attack manipulation
(if the attacker tries to manipulate the signal to his interests or only replay it) or the attack
manipulation objective (if the attacker manipulates the signal, the transmitted symbols, etc.).
However in [Hum09] is proposed a more clear classification, grouped in: Simplistic, Intermediate
and Sophisticated, depending on their complexity and on the di culties to detect and to apply
countermeasures.
With the objective of having a more clear vision of the great quantity of possible attacks
against GNSS, in Section 3.1 is carried out an overview of the most common attacks against
GNSS described in previous works [Hum09] [Psi16] [Sch16] [JJ12], showing its key features and
possible countermeasures. Section 3.2 will be focus on the unpredictable bits estimation attacks.
Such attacks try to estimate the unpredictable bits of the navigation message, with the objective
of obtaining a replica as similar as possible of the real signal sent by the satellite. Finally, in
Section 3.4 will be shown a brief study of how much time requires the spoofer to estimate
correctly these unpredictable bits in di↵erent conditions of C/No.
3.1 GNSS Attacks Overview
3.1.1 Spoofing Attacks Classification
In [Hum09] is proposed a possible classification of spoofing attacks against GNSS. They are
divided in three categories:
• Simplistic Spoofing Attacks: The simplest spoofer attacks in GNSS are composed by a
signal generator connected to a transmitting antenna. This attack can be easily detected,
since generally it is not able to synchronize the signals with the satellites in view, and the
pseudorange, C/No and Doppler jumps will occur. A receiver could be fooled by a GNSS
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signal generator, specially if the target receiver is jammed and forced to reacquire the
satellites. This spoofing attacks are quite expensive, due to they require specific hardware
such as a GNSS signal generator, which is expensive (about $ 400k) and it is not portable.
• Intermediate Spoofing Attacks: This attack category contains more complex attacks
than the previous one. this attack combine a GNSS receiver with a transmitting RF front-
end. This type of spoofer is able to synchronize the frequency and align the code-phase
between the real and the counterfeit signals. When the signals from the satellites are
tracked by the attacker receiver, it has a perfect knowledge of both the Doppler shift and
the spreading code delay. Most of the receivers correctly modified can be converted into
spoofer devices, reverting the receiving chain, adding some o↵sets to each satellite signal
and broadcasting a modified version of the received signal in the air. This type of spoofer
is able to modify the signal strength of the counterfeit signal, in order to simulate that
the signal comes from the satellite (and its strength is extremely lower, compared to a
transmission coming from the earth). The victim receiver is not able to distinguish the
counterfeit signal from the genuine, since the spoofer accurately reproduce the code phase,
frequency and navigation data bits. This last thing requires a bit prediction and estimation
procedure to attack in real-time. In Figure 3.1 the general procedures in Intermediate
Spoofing Attacks are depicted.
The intermediate spoofing attacks can be built with software parts, RF components that
anyone can download and buy by a very reduced cost (a few hundred dollars). To perform
this attack is required a deep knowledge of GNSS signal processing. This document will
be focused in this kind of attacks.
• Sophisticated Spoofing Attacks: The Sophisticated Spoofing Attacks consists of a
coordinated and synchronized attack carried out by di↵erent spoofing devices. This type
of attack is the most complex to implement and deploy, and the most expensive and
di cult to perform. These attacks are also the hardest to defend against. In this attack
the spoofing devices act as a Beamforming antenna array, simulating the di↵erent angles
of arrival for di↵erent satellites. This can be accomplished either by keeping each spoofer
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Figure 3.1: Illustration of a typical Intermediate Spoofing Attack.
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fixed and transmitting the signals of all satellites with appropriately calculated delays, or
by having each spoofer transmitting the signal of exactly one satellite and mechanically
moving the spoofer around the target receiver. Implementing sophisticated spoofer based
on GNSS receivers is possible but technically unmanageable.
On the following lines will described some state-of-the-art attacks and countermeasures, in
order to introduce some of the key aspects of spoofing attacks and have a general idea of how
can be attacked.
3.1.2 Jamming Attacks
The most simple attack against GNSS is Jamming [AR15]. GNSS jammers broadcast an inter-
ference signal (typically white noise) in the frequency band used for the satellite. This attack
can be categorized as Denial of Service (DoS attack), since the GNSS is still available but the
signal is masked by the jammer power (whose power is diverse orders of magnitude higher than
the signal coming from the satellite, which is under the noise level). In Figure 3.2 shows some
jammer devices acquired by Fraunhofer IIS. The devices are portable and can be feed even by
the car cigarette lighter receptacle.
3.1.3 Meaconing Attacks
Meaconing attack [AR15] consists on the interception and rebroadcast of true GNSS signals
(or the recording and playback) with enough gain to overwhelm the true signal at the target
antenna. This attack does not modify the signals, so the target receiver’s PVT (Position,
Figure 3.2: Commercial jammers acquired by Fraunhofer IIS (Figure taken from [AR15]).
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Velocity and Time) solution is not modified directly, but the arrival of the signal at the target
GNSS receiver is delayed, producing the victim not being able to compute its true PVT solution.
Through a meaconing attack, even an encrypted GNSS signal (as the military L2 in GPS or
the Commercial Service in Galileo) can be attacked, since meaconing attack only rebroadcasts
the authentic signals. This attack is extremely easy to implement, since it only requires a few
RF components. Figure 3.3 summarizes the steps of replay attacks. The adversary captures
and replays the signal after a certain time, with a minimum delay called treplay due to the
rebroadcast RF generation. The signal arrives to the victim receiver with a certain delay, due to
the time the spoofer needs to rebroadcast the signal (treplay) plus the propagation time between
the spoofer and victim receiver.
3.1.4 SCER (Security Code Estimation and Replay) attacks
SCER attacks are close related to Meaconing attacks. The main di↵erence is that SCER attacks
allow greater flexibility than Meaconing attacks, since the target receiver PVT solution can be
manipulated. The attacker needs to despread, estimate and modify the signal at the same time
that is transmitted. In Section 3.1.4 these attacks are fully described.
3.1.5 Non-encryption Based Defences Against GNSS Attacks
3.1.5.1 Spatial Processing Techniques
Spoofing transmitters usually transmit several counterfeit signals from the same location, while
the authentic signals are transmitted from di↵erent satellites with di↵erent Direction of Arrival.
Therefore, a spatial processing technique such as beamforming can be employed [McD07]. The
receiver can use an antenna array and concentrate its radiation pattern in the direction of the
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Figure 3.3: Illustration of a general Meaconing attacks (Image obtained from [AR15].
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satellites, increasing the desired signal strength and attenuating the unwanted signals. Beam-
forming can also be used to estimate the Direction of Arrival (DoA) of the interference signal
and try to avoid them. This process is called Angle of Arrival (AoA) discrimination.
Another method based on spatial processing can be performed comparing the phase di↵erence
between two fixed antennas [Mon09] for a certain time (e.g. an hour). Knowing the position of
the antenna array and the satellites movement trajectory, the theoretical phase di↵erences can be
calculated and compared to the practical phase di↵erence observed by the antenna array in order
to discriminate the spoofer. The main drawbacks of comparing the phases is that it requires a
long time (about 1 hour) and a perfectly calibrated and known orientation antenna array. A
multiple-antenna spoofer might be able to defeat the multiple-antenna spoofing discrimination
techniques depending on the number of transmit antennas, the number of receiver antennas,
and the geometry of spoofer antennas with respect to the target receiver antennas. However,
sophisticated spoofing scenario may be impractical to realize.
3.1.5.2 Clock bias or Time of Arrival (ToA) Monitoring
The basis of this method is the assumption that range code transmitted to a distant receiver
by the spoofer will induce a time o↵set equal to the time required to transmit the signal to the
target [JJ13]. Even if the spoofer adds a time o↵set to coincide with the target’s local time,
anomalous variations in the clock bias will reveal the presence of a spoofer. This delay can
be observed in the PRN code o↵set and in unusual data bit transition boundaries. However,
this method will only be useful if the target is moving in relation to the spoofer, otherwise this
defence will be ine↵ective.
3.1.5.3 Received Power Monitoring (RPM)
This technique looks at the total received power in an absolute scale. This requires looking at
all the received amplitudes and at the receiver RF front end’s automatic gain control (AGC)
set point [Ako12], which has low computational complexity. The total power might increase at
the inception of an attack if the spoofer required a substantial power advantage respect to the
original GNSS signal. The risk of false alarms would be a serious problem for this technique,
since signal levels vary due to atmospheric and solar interference.
3.1.5.4 C/No Monitoring
The basis of this detection method relies on monitor and detect sudden or unusual variations in
the C/No, which would mean an spoofer attack [JJ12]. In open sky conditions C/No might show
smooth changes in the received signal power due to satellite movement and ionosphere variations,
24 Chapter 3. Attacks Against GNSS
and sudden changes due to the presence of spoofer attack, since the spoofer transmission is
considered interference to the real GNSS signal, which will decrease the C/No of the authentic
signal. C/No is easily computable, and most of the GNSS receivers employ C/No measurements
as a parameter that characterizes the received signal quality, which could be used for detecting
an attack. However, this method may be sensible to multipath signals, which signal may increase
the interference and decrease the C/No at the receiver.
3.1.5.5 Received Power and C/No Variations Related to Movement and Position
A di↵erent way to analyse the C/No could rely on the fact that the spoofer is transmitting all the
PRN signals from the same place, and from a certain distance much smaller than the distance to
the satellites located on the earth instead of the space [Jua11]. Therefore, if the receiver moves
on the earth surface in low multipath open sky environments, no considerable changes in the
received power from authentic satellites should be observed other than the deterministic losses
occurring at lower elevation due to free space signal propagation. However, since the spoofing
signal is usually transmitted from a single directional antenna located much closer to the receiver
compared to the GPS satellites, the movement of the receiver relative to the spoofer antenna
can considerably change the C/N0 received from spoofing signals.
This occurs because when the spoofer is very close to the target receiver, even a slight
movement between spoofer and the target receiver can considerably a↵ect the received spoofing
signal C/No, due to the fact that as spoofing signals are usually transmitted from the same
antenna, all experience the same propagation medium and similar channel. Therefore, variations
of all spoofing signals will be the same regardless of the receiver movement and multipath e↵ects.
This method is a low-complexity spoofing defence technique that does not require extensive
hardware or software modifications to the GPS receiver. However, since the receiver does not
necessarily knows the position of the spoofer antenna and the distance variations with respect
to the receiver antenna, there is no guarantee that the receiver movement considerably changes
the received C/No. Another drawback of this technique is that it cannot be employed for the
case of static GPS receivers.
3.1.5.6 L1/L2 Power Level Comparison
Many GPS receivers are able to monitor both L1 and L2 signals which has a predefined power
level di↵erence [Wen17]. A low-complexity spoofer may only be able to generate the L1 signal.
Thus, if L2 signal is not received, it can reveal the presence of spoofer. The main problem is that
most of the civil GPS receivers do not have the ability to monitor both L1 and L2 frequency
bands and this discrimination technique imposes additional hardware complexity to the GPS
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receiver.
3.1.5.7 Doppler Shift Detection
The defence based on method relies on detecting anomalies in Doppler frequency, specifically
Doppler shift between real and simulated constellations. This means compare the Doppler e↵ect
measured in the receiver, with the simulated, in order to observe any trace of the spoofer’s
presence [FP03] [Sch16].
3.1.5.8 Complex Correlation Function
This method consists in looking at the complex correlation function from which a receiver
synthesizes discriminators for its tracking loops [Psi14]. During the initial drag-o↵ of the signal
in a spoofing attack, misalignments between the true and spoofed code and carrier phases
might occur, which result in distorted autocorrelation functions. Plotting the In-phase (I) vs
Quadrature (Q) accumulations view of the complex correlation function, can be observed as the
interaction of a spoofer signal will distort this picture, and instead of observe a straight line, it
will be opened, and we will observe it distorted, since the autocorrelation will not be planar.
The detection method that looks at the complex correlation function has two main draw-
backs. In first place, natural multipath signals produce similar results. So, a spoofing detector
would need to verify if the observed distortion was not produced by mere multipath. The second
problem is that this method might have a poor performance if the spoofer greatly overpowers
the true signal. In this case, very little distortion occurs because, the true signal is too much
smaller than the spoofed signal.
3.1.5.9 Reacquisition Technique
This method can work long after drag-o↵. This technique constantly attempts to reacquire all
the tracked signals [Psi16]. This method performs a brute-force search for each signal over the
entire range of possible code phases and carrier Doppler shifts. A brute-force acquisition search
requires a heavy signal processing load on the receiver. A di↵erent strategy could be to search
sequentially for additional instances of the tracked signals, one signal at a time. Then, if a second
version of any received signal is detected, the receiver could then attempt to sort out the true
signal versions from the spoofed ones in hopes of recovering its true navigation functionality.
However, this technique could be defeated by an overly powerful spoofer. Part of its e↵ect
could be to jam the true signals, making them undetectable during the reacquisition search.
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3.1.5.10 Received Ephemeris Consistency Check
The navigation message of each satellite contains some ephemeris information corresponding to
the position of other GPS satellites. This information can be obtained from other sources and
compared. if any inconsistency among these ephemeris data is present, this can alert of spoofing
attack [JJ12].
3.1.5.11 GPS Clock Consistency Check
The GPS clock information is contained in the navigation message of each PRN signal. The GPS
clock obtained from the di↵erent satellites should be consistent enough. However, the GPS time
extracted from an unsynchronized spoofer might not be consistent with the GPS time extracted
from other satellites and this can alert the presence of a spoofing attack [JJ12].
3.1.5.12 Vestigial Signal Detection
In most cases, after successful spoofing attack, a vestige of the authentic signal can be used for
spoofing detection and mitigation [EH08]. In this technique the receiver copies the incoming
digitized front-end data into a bu↵er memory. Then, the receiver selects one of the GPS signals
being tracked and removes the locally regenerated version of this signal from the bu↵ered signal.
Finally, the receiver performs acquisition for the same PRN signal on the bu↵ered data.
The main drawback of the vestigial signal detection is that it increases the hardware and
processing complexity of the receivers because this technique requires additional tracking chan-
nels to track both authentic and spoofing signals. In addition, in the presence of high power
spoofing signals the authentic vestige might not still be detectable.
3.1.5.13 Consistency Check with Other Navigation and Positioning Technologies
The GPS receiver can compare the solution extracted by received GPS signals to the other
position and navigation solutions obtained by mobile networks (3G/4G/5G) or WiFi stations
[JJ12]. Therefore, if the solution provided does not coincide, there is a high likelihood of a
spoofing condition. Employing this spoofing detection technique increases the hardware and
software complexity of GPS receiver. In addition, alternative positioning technologies such as
cellular networks do not usually provide position solutions as accurate as GPS signals, and the
coverage is reduced.
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3.1.5.14 Receiver autonomous integrity monitoring (RAIM)
This method is the oldest and the most widely used anti-spoofing strategy in GNSS receivers.
This method checks all available GNSS signals for spatial consistency, and can exclude erroneous
satellites [Kuu07]. For example, the ephemeris data predicts the location of satellites in advance,
and this should closely agree with their reported position in the navigation message and external
sources. In the case of authentic signals, the frequency changes due to the Doppler e↵ect, and
the PRN code is delayed to maintain signal lock. A low-quality spoofer might not be able to
keep this correlation. Another RAIM procedure could be looking for clock consistency times
with other satellites not currently being tracked.
The main weakness of RAIM is that it assumes that any spoofing attack will be confined to
one or two satellites, not the entire constellation.
Receiver	capability	Spoofing	Feature	Effectiveness	Complexity	Detection	method	
ToA analysis Clock bias inconsistent Medium Medium Clock bias or ToA Monitoring 
Antenna Array AoA nulling or Phase comparison High High Spatial Processing 
C/No monitoring Higher C/No Medium Low C/No Monitoring 
Power monitoring Higher Signal power Low Low Received Power Monitoring 
L2 reception capability No presence of L2 signal Low Medium L1/L2 Power Level Comparison 
C/No monitoring High power due proximity Low Low 
Power and C/No Variations 
Related to Movement 
Code and carrier phase 
monitoring 
Non-alignments in code and 
carrier phases 
Low High Complex Correlation Function 
Doppler monitoring Inconsistent Doppler variations Medium Medium Doppler Shift Detection 
Acquire the Ephemeris 
data by other source 
Inconsistency of received Ephemeris Low Low 
Received Ephemeris 
Consistency Check 
- Fake PRN signals Low Low Reacquisition Technique 
Vestigial presence of true signal Medium High Vestigial Signal Detection 
- 
Inconsistency of the GPS clock 
between satellites 
Low Low GPS Clock Consistency Check 
RAIM 
Different navigation sensors Inconsistency of spoofing solution High High 
Consistency Check with 
Other Solutions 
RAIM capability Inconsistent satellites Low Medium 
Additional tracking channels 
Table 3.1: Summary of the spoofing detection methods key features.
3.1.6 Encryption Based Defences Against GNSS Attacks: Navigation Mes-
sage Authentication (NMA)
Cryptography has often been proposed as a solution to attacks against GNSS. Encryption intro-
duces unpredictability in the navigation message, so that producing a counterfeit signal would
be more di cult. The encryption can be performed at chip level [Poz10] or at data level [FH16]
[Lev11] [O’H10] [Cur17] [Cap17]. However, most of the devices use the unencrypted civilian
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signals, and adding any form of encryption to those public protocols is not possible, due to the
fact that most of the receivers would not be used any more because they will require critical
modifications. Another serious limitation of cryptographic methods is that they are not very
useful against replay attacks such as meaconing or SCER, since the encryption method can be
replayed or estimated.
Navigation message authentication (NMA) generally refers to encryption protocols that pro-
vide authentication and integrity protection to the Navigation Message. The user can check if
the received Navigation Message is authentic and it has not been intercepted and modified by
an attacker. To add authentication and integrity to the Navigation Message can be performed
by Symmetric Key Encryption, Asymmetric Key Encryption, Digital Signature, etc. It can also
be performed by more complex key systems, such as Timed E cient Stream Loss-Tolerant Au-
thentication (TESLA). On the following lines are described the di↵erent procedures mentioned
before.
3.1.6.1 Symmetric Encryption
This method consists in encrypt the Navigation Message (although the key could be instead
applied to the spreading code, encrypting the entire signal) with a certain private key, which is
shared to the receivers (symmetric encryption), similar to which is done in military applications
[Sch16]. Only the receivers that have the key are able to decrypt the Navigation Message. The
receivers that does not have it, will not be able to decrypt the Message, and thus by any way
modify it. The key authenticates the Navigation Message, since ideally only the satellite and
authorised receivers can manage the key.
If the key is applied to the spreading code the spoofer would need first to decrypt the signal
under the noise level to be able to modify and rebroadcast the authentic GNSS signal.
Symmetric encryption, although providing a very high level of resistance to spoofing, are
impractical for a civilian receiver due to the required level of secrecy in the key and necessary
modifications (which in fact could need to be renewed) in the receivers.
3.1.6.2 Asymmetric Encryption
The main di↵erence of asymmetric encryption is that a pair of associated keys are generated
instead of a single one. One of them is kept private and the other is become of public domain.
The key-pair completely reverses to each other in the process of encryption and decryption.
Before the satellite sends the Navigation Data, it is encrypted using the private key. At the user
receiver, the public key is used to decrypt the message and be able to read it. By this procedure
the navigation data is authenticated, since the only key that could encrypt the message is the
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private key embedded in the satellites.
The main drawback, as most of the cryptographic techniques, is that the main structure
of GPS signals is changed, and in consequence the receivers. Asymmetric encryption would
require a modification of the current GPS receivers, which would have to store the public key
and include the decrypt process. Moreover, asymmetric keys must be longer than symmetric
keys to provide the same level of security, which requires a higher computational capacity during
the encryption/decryption process.
3.1.6.3 Timed Efficient Stream Loss-Tolerant Authentication (TESLA)
TESLA uses a delayed key disclosure scheme to provide authentication and integrity of messages
[Her15] [Per02]. With TESLA are generated an extremely long key-chain of length L, by choosing
a random secret key kL (first key), and it is recursively applied a one-way function F (·) by which
if F (A)! B, F (B) 6! A, until the last key k0 (root key) is obtained. These generated keys are
then used by the satellite in reverse order to sign the message. Due to the one-way property
of the key-chain, knowing ki does not give any information on key ki+j 8j > 0 since they are
sent in reverse order. The receiver is thus able to authenticate the key by applying the one-way
function i times to recover the root key. This root key must be previously authenticated by
other means, such as digital signature. The receiver might not need to perform the one-way
function i times until reach the root key, it only needs to reach the last authenticated key kj
(F i j(ki) with j < i).
TESLA uses the keys from the key-chain described above for building the MAC’s (Message
Authentication Code). If the satellite at the time instant i wants to send the message Mi,
then could be used the key ki to compute the MAC as MACi = S(Mi, ki) (where S is the
authenticating algorithm). The packet transmitted is composed by Pi = [Mi,MACi,Ki d] with
d > 0.
The receiver is not able to authenticate the received packet Pi = [Mi,MACi,Ki d] instan-
taneously, because it does not know the value of Ki, which has been used to compute the MAC.
So the receiver has to wait d time instants to receive Ki. Once it has been received, the receiver
checks if the received key ki is valid. In case it is correct, the receiver will be able to compute
the MAC for the received data with Ki, and determine if this MAC is equal to the received one
by doing MACi = S(Mˆi, kˆi) =\MACi (where the received parameters are depicted with a b)
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3.2 Unpredictable Bit Estimation Attacks
First of all, in Section 3.2.1 the received signal model is described, which will be useful to
describe the SCER attack strategies and the counterfeit techniques. In Section 3.2.2 the Forward
Estimation Attacks (FEA) are explained, and how they are related to NMA. Then in Section
3.2.3 are described the SCER attacks under NMA. Two di↵erent strategies are described by
which the spoofer can estimate the unpredictable bits of the Navigation Message in order to
perform a zero-delay SCER attack under NMA. In Section 3.2.4 a possible strategy of FEA
attack is described, showing its peculiarities.
In Section 3.3 a comparison between a recorded real signal and a synthetically generated
spoofing signal (based on the authentic) is shown, demonstrating that both of them are prac-
tically identical. Finally, in Section 3.4 the e ciency in the symbol estimation of the spoofer
under di↵erent conditions of C/No is shown.
3.2.1 Received Signal Model
The received signal (considering only the L1 C/A code) by the spoofer (or in fact by any receiver)
after being down-converted (to intermediate frequency), filtered and transformed to the digital
domain with an Analog to Digital Converter (ADC) can be written as
Y (n) =
NX
k=1
AkSk(n  τk)e
j2pi(fIF fk)n+ϕk +Wk(n), (3.1)
where Ak is the carrier amplitude, Sk(n) is the useful signal, τk is the code delay, fk is the
Doppler frequency and ϕk the complex random phase of the k-th satellite from the total set
of N that are in view; fIF is the receiver Intermediate Frequency and Wk(n) is the AWGN
(Additive White Gaussian Noise) noise for the k-th satellite. n denotes discrete-time domain.
Sk(n) is the useful data signal transmitted by the k-th satellite and can be expressed as
Sk(n) =
1X
l= 1
Dl
Nr 1X
i=0
Ck(n  iTcode   lTd), (3.2)
where Dl = { 1, 1} are the possible data symbols (considering BPSK modulation) at a rate
of Rd = 1/Td bits per second (Rd =50 bps in L1 C/A code) that constitutes the Navigation
Message, Ck(n) = { 1, 1} is the spreading code or PRN sequence for the k-th satellite, Tcode is
the total time duration of the spreading code (1 ms in L1 C/A code) and Nr is the total number
of times Tcode is repeated within each bit interval.
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3.2.2 Forward Estimation Attacks (FEA)
FEA attacks [Cur17] exploits the redundancy of some of the symbols transmitted by the satel-
lites. This redundancy may be mainly due to two reasons. The first reason is due to the
redundancy introduced by channel coding in the transmission of the Navigation Data. The
Navigation Data can be coded before being transmitted in order to be able to recover the trans-
mitted bits even when some of them are received corrupted. For example, if the Navigation
data is coded with a Rate 1/2, this means that by each symbol of real data, the transmitter (in
this case the satellite) will transmit two symbols. This produces that twice the number of the
necessary bits are transmitted. With this coding rate half of the bits are unnecessary to decode
the entire codeword in good transmission conditions. With the channel coding, the attacker
does not need to predict perfectly all the symbols. The attacker may send random bits to the
victim at the beginning, when the attacker doesn’t have a reliable codeword estimate. Forward
Error Correction (FEC) in the victim receiver will most likely correct the wrong symbols. Since
FEC corrects the wrong bits, the victim will think that the received message is authentic, since
on the surface there are no di↵erences between the real and counterfeit signals.
The second reason of redundancy is due to the Navigation Data itself. Navigation Data
contains some information, such as Ephemeris and Almanacs that can be obtained by other
means since they are of public domain. With this information the attacker has information
about the Navigation message that has not even been received, so some of the information
transmitted by the satellite can be predicted by the spoofer. With those predicted bits the
spoofer can perform an attack such as shown in Section 3.2.4.
3.2.3 Zero-delay SCER Attacks Under NMA
NMA introduces unpredictability in the data stream (this is explained in Section 3.2.2) or at
the chip level. In [DW12] is proposed a general model for zero-delay SCER attacks under NMA
based on a GNSS signal protected by some security code Wk. We can modify (3.1) to introduce
the Wk code as:
Y (n) =
NX
k=1
WkAkSk(n  τk)e
j2pi(fIF fk)n+ϕk +W (n), (3.3)
where W = { 1, 1} is a certain security sequence with time length Tw that protects the signal.
The protection relies on the spreading code Wk, which is required in reception after being
applied before transmission to be able to obtain the signal correctly, which in fact is the same
that happens with any other spreading code.
The proposed model in (3.3) is based on that the GNSS signal transmitted by the satellites is
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protected by a certain Wk spreading code (with a certain code rate) composed by unpredictable
chips, which is a secondary code similar as the PRN codes of the SV’s. The spoofer receives
and tracks the real signal coming from the satellite, and attempts to estimate the unpredictable
security code chips on-the-fly in order to by able to reproduce the signal. These Wk chips are
required to despread the received signal, and adds an extra protection to the GNSS signal, since
the signal can only be despreaded with the associated Wk code. After those security code chips
are estimated, the spoofer reconstitutes a GNSS signal, with the security code chips estimate
taken the place of the authentic codes, and rebroadcast this signal to the victim receiver.
The real process will consist in estimate chip-by-chip the received symbol in order to be able
to reconstruct the signal as if this signal were the authentic. The security code Wk in (3.3) is
useful to model the chip uncertainty produced by NMA.
The new generated signal after estimating the Wk chips will have unavoidably a certain delay
due to the estimation process (also the time it takes the spoofer to modify the position and timing
o↵sets of the signal, in order to modify the PVT solution) and transmission delay. Although this
delay can be neglected if the spoofer is close enough to the victim and the estimation-rebroadcast
process is done on-the-fly (as soon as the samples arrives the spoofer are rebroadcast). Depending
on the delay of the rebroadcast signal, the spoofer will have to force to reacquire the signal in
the victim receiver. If this delay is shorter than a code chip interval, the spoofer will be able to
dislodge the target receiver’s tracking loops without forcing reacquisition. On the contrary, if
the delay of the retransmitted signal is greater than the spreading code chip, the spoofer must
first jam or obstruct the incoming GNSS signal to force the victim to reacquire the satellites.
Based on the circumstances described above, in Section 3.2.3.1 and Section 3.2.3.2 two
strategies the spoofer can consider to estimate Wk from the transmitted symbols in (3.3) are
described and how the signal can be reconstructed as soon as possible.
3.2.3.1 Chip-By-Chip Estimation Strategy
The first spoofer strategy to determine the symbol sent by the satellite consists in estimate and
rebroadcast the received samples on-the-fly. Since this attack is a zero-delay attack, the spoofer
cannot wait to receive the whole bit to perform the symbol estimation previous step to send it
back as if this symbol were the real bit. If the spoofer did that, it would produce a minimum
delay of 20 ms, which is the time duration of a single bit in GPS L1 C/A code signal. Since the
estimation process cannot have estimation delays, the counterfeit bit has to be sent back at the
same time the spoofer is receiving the original.
To estimate the data symbols Dˆl, the spoofer needs first to despread the received signal
with the aligned version of the code replica Ck from the output of the tracking loops. Then the
spoofer needs to accumulate the received samples and estimate the symbol in each time instant
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n. In order to do so, the spoofer applies
Dˆl(Ns) = sign
 
NsX
n=1
Y (n)
!
, (3.4)
where Ns is the total number samples received containing a single bit (with a maximum value
of 20ms ·Fs, where Fs is the sampling frequency of the receiver), sign(·) is the sign function (its
output is +1 if the input is positive, or -1 if the input is negative). Dˆl(Ns) = { 1, 1} represents
the estimated symbol in the time-instant Ns.
According to (3.4), after each time-instant is obtained an estimation of Dˆl, which takes a
value of ±1, depending on the sign of the accumulated received samples. The signal is then
rebuilt and sent back to the victim, including the bit estimation Dˆl, along with the rest of
parameters obtained from the tracking loops, such as the Doppler frequency or code phase delay.
As a result, the counterfeit signal will be exactly equal as the real, as long as the estimation Dˆl
is correct. This estimation may vary along the time, since it is very dependant on the quality
of the received signal (e.g How noisy the received samples are). This variation of Dˆl ends once
has been received enough samples to estimate correctly the received bit. In Section 3.4 a set
of simulations are carried out in order to determine the influence of the noise in the time of
estimation of the bit. In Figure 3.4 a few ms of the beginning of the bit are shown, in which
is depicted the bit estimation process. Figure 3.4 shows that during the first µs, there is a
recognizable pattern in the estimated samples. The first samples vary significantly quick until it
reaches a steady value. This variation of the estimation in the beginning of the bits is produced
basically by the presence of noise in the received samples. This noise hides the real bit sent by
the satellite and adds the spoofer more di culties to get a quick and trustworthy estimation.
Once the spoofer has accumulated enough samples, the symbol sent back by the spoofer is the
correct and it is maintained along the remaining samples of the bit, with no more polarity
variations.
It should be noted that the first estimation sample of Dˆl, must be generated before the
first sample of the signal coming from the satellite reaches the spoofer receiver. The performed
attack is a zero-delay attack, and thus the samples must reach the victim receiver at the same
time the satellite samples reaches the spoofer. Therefore, the spoofer needs to determine the
estimation of the bit polarity before the information has been received from the satellite. The
spoofer does not have any other option that try to guess the bit polarity by sending a certain
BPSK symbol among the two possible. So, the spoofer sends a ±1 symbol sample, which could
be right or wrong. When the second sample has to be sent back, the spoofer is able to estimate
the bit with the sample received in the first time instant. The estimation process will not be
too reliable, since it has only available a single sample to estimate the bit, and it may be very
noisy. The spoofer makes this process continuously. So, the attacker accumulates the received
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Figure 3.4: Chip-by-Chip estimation process of a bit.
samples, and estimates the bit in each time instant using the total amount of available received
samples.
3.2.3.2 Bit-Guess Estimation Strategy
This second proposed strategy attack has some similarities with the described in first place.
This attack is a zero-delay attack as well as the previous one, and it also estimates the real bit
by accumulating the received samples in each time instant. But the main di↵erence with the
attack proposed in Section 3.2.3.1 is in the first milliseconds of transmission process, while the
estimation process is carried out and there is no certainty of the right polarity of the bit that
has been sent by the satellite. In this attack, the spoofer does not rebroadcast the bit estimation
sample-by-sample, as in the previous one. The spoofer does not send the bit estimation until
it is highly probable that the estimation is correct (or at least the spoofer is almost sure that
the estimated polarity of the bit is right). The spoofer waits a prudent time or waits until
the estimated polarity is repeated a certain number of times. Instead of sending the current
estimation of the bit sample-by-sample, the spoofer has to determine the symbol polarity to
transmit. This symbol polarity can be chosen by chance, or the spoofer might predict them
(before receiving them from the navigation message) as good as possible with some logic, for
example predicting the transmitted information. For example, the Ephemeris data can be
obtained publicly from other sources such as the Internet. With all the information that the
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spoofer can get from other sources di↵erent than the real signal transmitted by the satellite,
the spoofer is able to build a fake navigation message similar to the real one. This tampered
Navigation Message is then modulated using BPSK modulation and used to determine the
symbol to transmit in the first milliseconds of the counterfeit signal rebroadcast. The process
of choosing the symbol to send cannot produce any delay in the rebroadcast process, since this
attack is also a zero-delay attack. This predicted polarity is maintained until the estimation
carried out in background is likely to be correct. Once the estimation of the bit is finished, the
spoofer changes the polarity of the bit if needed. In Figure 3.5 this process is depicted, with
an example where the symbol polarity determined at the beginning of the bit is needed to be
modified after knowing that it was incorrect.
After the estimation process is complete, and the bit is totally rebroadcast to the victim,
two options can occur:
• The first case to consider is when the bit random guess made by the spoofer has been right.
In this case, the entire bit will be correct, and exactly equal as the sent by the satellite,
since no sample will have di↵erent polarity compared with the real signal. In addition,
this bit will be received with no delay, or at least this delay can be considered negligible.
In this case the spoofer will be harder to detect.
• The second case is when the bit random guess made by the spoofer is wrong. If the random
guess is wrong, the first samples and the last ones of the transmitted symbol will have the
polarity inverted. This happens because one of the edges of the bit will be transmitting
one of the two possible symbols, and the other edge the other one, due to the fact that
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Figure 3.5: Bit-guess estimation process of a single bit.
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the only possible symbols are 1, since the transmission modulation is a BPSK. This means
that the beginning and the ending of the bit will have di↵erent sign. In addition, the total
energy of the bit will be lower than an ordinary bit transmission, since some of the energy
will be wasted on sending the wrong bit guess on the first samples. Analysing this two
features, the sign and the energy, can be detected if a certain signal is the original or not,
as it will be shown afterwards.
3.2.4 FEA Strategies
The third attack considered in this document follows a completely di↵erent approach compared
with the attacks described above [Cur17]. In this attack the spoofer does not sent the estimation
of the real bit at any moment. This time the spoofer does not estimate the real symbol in order
to send a reliable copy of the bit. In this occasion the attacker makes a guess at the beginning
of the symbol and this guess is maintained all along the entire transmitted symbol. This guess
may be based on some prediction, so the guess may be carried out with some logic. However,
the real bit transmitted by the satellite is estimated anyway in order to know if the choice made
at the beginning of the transmission has been right or wrong. Then, this information can be
used by the spoofer to try to compensate the mistake.
This attack starts by transmitting a certain symbol by selecting one of the two possible by
chance (since a BPSK modulation is used), or by building a counterfeit Navigation Message. If
all the bits are chosen by chance, the Navigation Data received by the victim will usually not be
consistent, since no real data has been modulated and the information, such as the Ephemerides
or clocks, will not show the current position or real o↵sets of the acquired satellites. This might
be solved by generating a manipulated Navigation Message with consistent data, obtaining the
data to transmit from other sources.
The peculiarity of this attack respect to the shown in Section 3.2.3.2 is that the amplitudes of
the transmitted bits are sometimes not steady all along the entire bit period. In this attack the
amplitude of the first µs of the bit , depicted as Tv, is increased above the rest in the following
symbol after a wrong transmitted symbol. It means that during a few µs the amplitude increased
is higher than the usual amplitude of the symbol. For example, if the transmitted symbol is
a +1 symbol, and the amplitude should be +1, in this few µs it will be larger than 1. The
window of time Tv where the amplitude is increased is determined by the amount of observation
time it is taken by the defendant receiver. Therefore the attacker is free to chose any value of
Tv, but the attacker should take into account that as shorter is Tv, the di↵erence between the
maximum and minimum amplitude of the signal will be bigger, since the total energy must be
the same. After the first samples are increased, the amplitude of the rest of them is reduced
below the required level in order to maintain the energy of the transmitted bit equal as if no
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modification of the signal has been carried out. This procedure is depicted in Figure 3.6. In
this Figure Is shown as the amplitude in the first ms has been increased, and after that, the
amplitude does not return to 1, but it goes under 1 to maintain the energy of the bit the same
as if no modification has been performed.
In Figure 3.7 is represented the form it takes the signal when this attack is performed. We
shown as with this attack is performed, there is no constant amplitude of ±1 symbols. The
amplitudes takes di↵erent values depending on the number of consecutive mistakes, and the
signal looks irregular at the beginning of certain symbols.
In parallel of the process of sending a certain symbol, the spoofer estimates in the background
the real bit sent by the satellite. After a certain time, the spoofer knows if the bit transmitted by
it has been right or wrong. The spoofer then uses this information in the subsequent counterfeit
symbols. Of course, this information cannot be used to decide the next symbol, but it can be
useful to determine an appropriate amplitude in the first samples of the following symbol. After
each wrong guess, the amplitude of the first samples in the next symbol will be doubled (not
exactly doubled as it will be shown in the following lines). This means that after two consecutive
wrong guesses, the amplitude of the first samples in the next symbol will be increased four times.
So, the amplitude will grow exponentially after failing consecutively. After each right guess, the
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Figure 3.6: Single symbol transmission with increased amplitude and no modification of the energy of
the bit.
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Figure 3.7: Shape of the transmitted signal when the attack Bit-Guess Estimation Technique With
Adaptable Amplitude is performed..
amplitude of the subsequent symbol will be restored to the usual amplitude.
In Figure 3.8 an example of this increased amplitude is depicted. Figure 3.8 shows as
symbols 1 and 2 are guessed correctly, and no modification of the amplitude in the subsequent
bit is required. However, symbol 3 is guessed wrong, and the amplitude of the counterfeit symbol
4 is increased to 3. This value comes from the fact that the new amplitude must compensate
the previous errors. For example, in that case we have sent 3 symbols, the last of them wrong,
the amplitude of the fourth symbol should be compensated. Therefore, the received energy will
be 1 + 1 + 1   1 = 2 due the error, instead of 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 = 4. If we want to compensate
this error, the amplitude of the last symbol should be 3 since 1 + 1   1 + 3 = 4 maintains the
same energy as if no mistake has been made. The new amplitude follows the next expression:
2(∆E+1)   1, where  E = 1, 2, 3, ... are the accumulated symbol errors. The amplitudes then fill
follow the sequence 1, 3, 7, 15, ... if 0, 1, 2, 3, ... errors has been made respectively. Following with
Figure 3.8, symbol 4 is then guessed correctly, and since the amplitude has been increased by
the necessary amount , the error in symbol 3 has been compensated. In symbols 5, 6, 7 and 8 is
shown the e↵ect of consecutive wrong guesses. It these cases the amplitude is increased further
almost exponentially after each wrong guess.
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Figure 3.8: Example of increased consecutive symbol amplitudes after wrong bit guesses.
3.3 Counterfeit Signal vs Authentic Signal
In this section are compared the features of the real recorded signal against the spoofer synthet-
ically generated signal of the same recorded signal. The real signal was recorded in the geodesic
point located at the Faculty of Veterinary Medicine of the Autonomous University of Barcelona
[41  300 14.6715200N, 2  50 57.2662700E] the 12th February 2014. The signal was recorded with a
SiGe GN3S Sampler v3 and a computer. Once the signal was recorded, the GPS Software re-
ceiver in MATLAB developed by David S. De Lorenzo was used to carry out the acquisition and
tracking process. The position solution was determined from the tracking results. To generate
the Spoofing signal the GPS Signal Simulator was used, also developed by David S. De Lorenzo,
but properly modified to generate the spoofing signal chip-by-chip.
In first place we compare the results after the acquisition process, when as input of the
Software receiver are placed the authentic and spoofer signals. In the left part of Table 3.2 are
summarized the acquisition results for the authentic signal. Table 3.2 shows the PRN of the
satellites acquired, the CPPR (correlation peak to next peak ratio) for each PRN and a first
approximation of the code o↵sets and Doppler frequencies of each acquired satellite for both the
authentic and synthetic signal. Comparing both Tables can be observed as the values obtained
after the acquisition are very similar in both cases. In both cases has been acquired the same
SV with similar CPPR, code o↵set and Doppler frequency values.
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8 4.77
9 5.05
PRN	 CPPR	
5 3.84
26 4.51
28 4.43
10 3.27
15 4.29
26 4.27 163 -1042
28 4.18 0 -583
870.72.9410
-2725
1195710.7
Doppler	Code	Offset	
2081318.6
2009265.2
-2724157.1
3692870.5
-5850
-1040163
1192710.83.65
Doppler	Code	Offset	CPPR	PRN	
2083318.74.999
2008265.25.388
157.24.6815
3692
Table 3.2: Authentic (left) and spoofing (right) signal Acquisition results.
Regarding the tracking results, Figure 3.9 shows a summary of the main parameters after
the tracking process. In Figure 3.9 has only been considered the PRN 10 satellite signal as an
example. Comparing both results we can determine that after a certain transition time at the
beginning, both signals are practically identical, specially the code o↵set. The main di↵erence
resides on that the C/No level in the spoofer signal is slightly higher. Although the C/No can be
controlled by the spoofer. But anyway, in general, both tracking results are practically identical.
Finally, the position solution obtained from the tracking data of the Software Receiver is
compared. Comparing the geodesic point coordinates where the data was collected with the
coordinates obtained using the tracking data from the Software Receiver can be observed as
with both signals are obtained similar results. With the real signal we obtain the position in
the coordinates 41  30 14.7374N 2  5 57.1472E, and with the spoofer signal in 41  30 14.6801N
2  5 57.4565E. Calculating the deviation respect to the real position given by the geodesic point,
it gives a deviation of about 2 m in both cases.
In short we could say that both signals are practically identical on the surface, but as we
will observe in Chapter 4, the spoofer is under the appearance of normality.
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Figure 3.9: Tracking results for the authentic (top) and Spoofing (bottom) PRN 10 signal.
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3.4 Symbol Estimation Performance
In this section is presented a brief study about the time required by the spoofer to successfully
estimate an unpredictable bit, such as described in Section 3.2 attacks. In Section 3.2 were
shown the two symbol estimation strategies that will be taken into account in this document.
In the first one, the spoofer estimates the received bits and rebroadcast them back to the victim
receiver as soon as the estimation was performed. On the contrary, in the second strategy the
spoofer chose randomly (or based on some logic) the bit to send the first N samples, until the
bit is likely to be correct. In both cases the estimation process is the same (estimating in the
background or using the current estimation), so the results presented in this section are equally
valid.
Table 3.3 summarizes the estimation times and number of samples (taking into account the
sampling frequency of the receiver, which is 5.456 MHz) needed by the spoofer to successfully
estimate Dl. Table 3.3 also shows the probability of correct symbol polarity detection (or
probability of Detection, Pd) during the time required to obtain a steady estimation of the
symbol and the detection probability during the first millisecond of symbol for di↵erent values
of C/No.
Table 3.3 shows as in low C/No levels (from 15 to 25 dB-Hz, which can be considered indoor
environments [SG12]) the required time for the correct estimation of the symbol sent by the
satellite can seem high. The spoofer needs about 2.8-5 ms, depending on the C/No level. But
taking into account that a whole bit transmission goes on for 20 ms, the required time actually
is quite low, since it only needs to receive less than 25% of the bit transmission in the worse case
C/No scenario to estimate the bit correctly. The Pd is about 60-70 % during the time required
to make the estimation steady, and between 60-80 % during the first millisecond. All this shows
a quite acceptable performance taking into account the low C/No level.
In medium C/No levels (between 25 to 35 dB-Hz, which can be considered soft indoor
environments [SG12]) the spoofer needs considerably less time, about 1.5-0.4 ms to estimate
correctly the bit, which is translated to about 7.5 % of the total bit transmission time. The Pd
in this C/No levels is around 75 % during the time required to make the estimation steady and
between 94-99 % during the first millisecond.
Finally, in high C/No (starting from about 35 dB-Hz, which can be considered outdoor
environments [SG12]) the required time is really low. The spoofer can determine the transmitted
symbol by the satellite in about 1 µs or even less. This time is less than 5 % of the whole bit
duration. The Pd is maintained about 75 % during the time required to make the estimation
steady, quite similar to lower C/No. However, the Pd is more than 99 % during the first
millisecond of transmission. This means that in the first millisecond, almost all the samples will
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be estimated correctly.
These results shows as an spoofer can estimate correctly and quite quick the symbol trans-
mitted by a satellite, even in indoor environments, where the C/No is relatively low. Table
3.3 also shows that when the spoofer is located in outdoor environments, the required time to
estimate the correct symbol is extremely low, since with less than 1 millisecond the spoofer can
determine the correct symbol with an excellent Pd of 99 %.
63.6860.75517281815
PD	During	
first	ms	of	the	
symbol	(%)	
PD	During	Full	
Estimation	
Time	(%)	
Time	
(μs)	
Samples	
C/No	
(dB-Hz)	
83.0369.38279152025
72.2765.73416227320
97.9673.574021635
94.2575.5311160530
99.7975.8742245
99.3874.75126740
99.9877.30.37255
99.9575.781.1650
Table 3.3: Estimation time for di↵erent levels of C/No.

4 Detection Methods
In this section two di↵erent detectors are proposed. These defences are focused at signal level,
in particular at chip level. They are thought as countermeasures against the attack strategies
described in Section 3.2, which are also attacks that modifies the signal at chip level. The
detection process is described step-by-step, in order to show the full process a receiver should
follow in order to implement the detectors. The first detection technique is described in Section
4.1, and consists in analyse the sign of the accumulated correlation value. The main di↵erence
between the first and second technique described in Section 4.2 is that in this case is analysed
the full correlation value instead just the sign.
The detection process is summarized in Figure 4.1. Basically the steps consist in:
1. The signal coming from te satellite is received by the attacker receiver. In this receiver is
performed the attack, where the bits are estimated if apply. For more information about
the attacks see Chapter 3. After modify the signal, the attacker rebroadcasts the signal to
the victim.
2. After the signal reaches the victim’s receiver, it stores a certain number of samples of the
beginning and ending of each received bit. Or in other words, it stores the first and last
portion of each bit. This is shown in step 1 of Figure 4.1, where a coloured dashed line
corresponds to the amount time the victim is storing. This time-window is chosen by the
victim depending on its capabilities and the performance that wants to be achieved. The
time-window could be a few µs or even some ms. As well as the portions of signal are
stored, the associated locally generated PRN code replica is also stored, which will be used
to despread the signal further.
3. The received signal is despread using the associated PRN local replica. After despreading
the signal we get a value for each bit, as shown in step 2 of Figure 4.1. This is done
separately for both the first and last part of each bit, obtaining a value for each part.
4. Then each value of β is correlated with the bit after 20 ms estimation, which in fact is the
true bit transmitted by the satellite.
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5. In step 4 of Figure 4.1, the detection method, which will be described next, is applied.
6. Finally, in step 5 of Figure 4.1 the results to determine if the signal is likely to be authentic
or counterfeit are analysed. If the mean of ⌦ is close to 1 will mean that is likely the signal
is authentic, since there are very few di↵erences between both edges of the bit. On the
contrary, as closer ⌦ is from zero will mean that the probability that the signal is counterfeit
is higher.
4.1 Detection Method 1: Sign Correlation Ratio (SCR) Detec-
tion Technique
This detection method is based on the knowledge of the bit once it has completely been received.
Since the bit is known, it can be correlated by the sign of the first an last correlation values of
each received bit. First of all we need to obtain the correlation values for each bit as
βFirst =
NWX
n=1
YFirst(n)CFirst(n),
βLast =
NWX
n=1
YLast(n)CLast(n),
(4.1)
Where YFirst(n) and YLast(n) are the part of the received down-converted signal corresponding
to the first and last part of the bit, and CFirst(n) and CLast(n) corresponds to the matched
aligned PRN code replica for a single satellite from the total set of N satellites. Nw is the
number of samples the receiver stores for each edge of the bit. NBit is the total number of
samples per bit (NBit =
Fs
1e 3 · 20 [samples/millisecond], where Fs is the sampling frequency
of the receiver and 20 samples/millisecond is due to the duration of a single bit in ms) and
T = NBit NW is the number of samples stored in the final part of the bit. This initial process
corresponds to steps 1 and 2 of Figure ??, where the process is depicted for some bits with
di↵erent colours for the first and last part of each bit.
After this, the spoofer correlates the values βFirst and βLast by the estimated bit after 20
ms integration, which in fact is the true bit transmitted by the satellite. With this correlation
by the true bit what we achieve is that if the sign of βFirst and βLast is wrong, these values
will contribute negatively to the detection. On the contrary the bits that has the same sign will
contribute positively. This process can be summarized as
⌦ =
BX
b=1
PNW
n=1 sign
 
βFirst(n)
(b)
 
· µ(b)PNW
n=1 sign
 
βLast(n)(b)
 
· µ(b)
, (4.2)
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where µ(b) corresponds to the set of received bits -1, 1, b = 1, 2, 3...B is the number of bits and
sign(·) is the sign function, whose output is 1 if the input value is positive, or -1 if the input
value is negative.
Checking the value ⌦ takes we can be determine the presence of spoofer. If ⌦ is close to
1 means that, in principle, the signal is authentic, since most of the sign of both edges of the
analysed bits will be approximately the same. On the contrary, if ⌦ is much lower than 1
means that the signal is likely to be counterfeit. During the correlation by µ(b), if the signal is
authentic the result will be approximately to the number of bits B considered in the correlation.
So both numerator and denominator will be approximately B. On the contrary, if the signal is
counterfeit, the denominator will be approximately B (since the bit in this point is equal as the
authentic), but the numerator will be far below from this value.
The correlation in 4.2 carried out for B bits, could be performed for a reduced number
defined as P P = B
J
, giving as a results some values of ⌦. For example considering B = 2000,
we could determine that J = 100, and then instead of receive a single value of ⌦ after correlate
B bits, we would obtain P values of ⌦. With this set of ⌦’s we can be perform a statistical
analysis to determine the presence of spoofer based on an hypothesis test. The values of ⌦ can
be fitted in a Gaussian Probability Density Function (PDF), in which can be computed the
Detection and False Alarm Probabilities (PD and PFA, respectively). This will be described in
Section 4.3.
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Figure 4.1: Illustration of the steps to implement the Detectors 2 and 3.
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4.2 Detection Method 2: Total Correlation Ratio (TCR) De-
tection Technique
This method is very similar to the presented in last Section 4.1. Actually, the only di↵erence
with the last one is the use of the full information provided by the correlation value, instead of
using only the sign information. Removing the sign(·) function in (4.2) we obtain
⌦ =
BX
b=1
PNW
n=1 βFirst(n)
(b) · µ(b)PNW
n=1 βLast(n)
(b) · µ(b)
, (4.3)
Similarly as before, if the value of ⌦ is close to 1, both correlation values are approximately
equal, and therefore the bit has no instabilities. On the contrary, if the value of ⌦ is much lower
than 1, the magnitude of both correlation values is much di↵erent, and thus the signal has been
probably modified. In this case the correlation makes use of the full information provided by
the amplitude, not just the sign.
4.3 Gaussian PDF Detection Process
The set of values in the vector ⌦ can be fitted into a Gaussian PDF, as has been already said in
previous Sections. The average process is done in order to obtain smoother values of mean and
sigma to compute the PDF. The most likely value (the mean of the Gaussian PDF) corresponds
to mean value of ⌦. Figure 4.2) shows two examples of PDF fitting for two di↵erent signals.
In the top plot is depicted an example where the spoofer cannot be detected. The green area,
which is the Detection probability (PD) is very low compared to the False Alarm probability
(PFA) depicted in Orange. In turn, the probability of Missed Detection (depicted in blue, which
in fact is PD   1) is very big. Thus, the spoofer cannot be detected with enough certainty. On
the contrary, in the example on the bottom part is depicted an example where the spoofer can
easily be detected. The example on the bottom part shows as the mean of the spoofer PDF
is close to zero, far away from the mean of the reference PDF that is close to 1. The PD is
larger than the PFA, and hence the spoofer can be detected better than in previous case. The
threshold has been set in the middle of both PDF’s only as an example. This threshold can be
moved along the di↵erent values, producing that PD and PFA vary as well.
The two hypothesis to detect the spoofer are the next
x ⇠
8<:H0 : f0(x)! Spoofer DetectedH1 : f1(x)! Spoofer Not Detected (Authentic Signal) , (4.4)
50 Chapter 4. Detection Methods
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5
x
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
P
D
F
-f
(x
)
Probability of Detection
Detection
Missed Detection
False Alarm
Threshold
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5
x
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
P
D
F
-f
(x
)
Probability of Detection
Detection
Missed Detection
False Alarm
Threshold
Figure 4.2: PDF comparison fitted from ⌦. In the top are compared two authentic signals. On the
bottom are compared the spoofer signal and and authentic signal.
where x denotes the data set; H0 and H1 are the two hypothesis; and f0 and f1 are the PDF’s
obtained from ⌦ when the signal contains spoofer and when it is authentic.
5 Results
In this section is analysed the accuracy of the detection methods described in Chapter 4 applying
the attack strategies described in Section 3.2. The performance of the detectors is tested in a
wide variety of conditions and situations. First of all, in Section 5.1 the results of the detection
methods described in Chapter 4 when they are applied to an authentic signal are summarized.
This results considers di↵erent levels of C/No and number of satellites in the signal, as well as
di↵erent victim’s receiver observation times. The results from the authentic signal will give us
a reference to compare when the detection methods are carried out against counterfeit signals.
Then, in the following sections are summarized the results using the same detection tech-
niques, but this time against signals under the attacks described in Section 3.2. The results
are summarized in Section 5.2. For each case are considered di↵erent levels of C/No, number
of satellites in the signal, di↵erent observation times of the victim receiver and di↵erent C/No
levels of the attacker. The attacker C/No contributes enormously to the accuracy and quickness
of the estimation time of the bits, as it is shown in Section 3.2.
For both cases, the spoofer and authentic signal, the same parameters has been taken into
account to analyse the signal:
• C/No levels: We have chosen the following C/No levels: 45 dB-Hz, 40 dB-Hz, 35 dB-Hz
and 30 dB-Hz. These C/No levels are used in both the spoofer and victim receivers. These
values has been chosen since they represent common values in outdoor environments, in
good (40 dB-Hz and 45 dB-Hz) and bad conditions (35 dB-Hz and 30 dB-Hz) [SG12].
Depending on the C/No level in the spoofer receiver, the spoofer will be able to estimate
better or worse the received bits, since the attacker’s C/No contributes enormously to the
accuracy and quickness of the estimation time of the bits. This is shown in Section 3.2.
The di↵erent C/No levels in the victim receiver will show the e↵ect of the noise in the
detection performance.
• Number of satellites present in the signal: We have taken into account three cases. When
there are present 1, 3 and 6 SV’s in the analysed signal. This is done with the objective
of showing the cross correlation e↵ects in the detection performance by increasing the
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number of PRN sequences.
• Victim observation time: Di↵erent observation times has been taken into account, starting
from only 0.9 µs (5 samples) to 550 µs (3000 samples). This observation time means
the number of samples the victim receiver will store in order to carry out the detection
techniques and be able to detect the spoofer presence. The reason of using this wide variety
of observation times is because we want to show the trade o↵ between the accuracy of the
detection method and the accuracy of the bit estimation from the received samples.
• Number of Bits: To obtain the results has been taken into account 2000 bits (B=2000).
The results have been averaged in blocks of 100 bits when the average process is performed.
Finally, in Section 5.3 the ROC (Receiver Operation Characteristic) for some of the detectors
obtained from detection method 1 is shown.
5.1 Reference Performance: Results Against Authentic Signals
Table 5.1 summarizes the results of the di↵erent detection methods against an authentic signal.
Table 5.1 shows the reference values, which we can compare later to the obtained against the
spoofer, in order to determine if an attacker is present in the analysed signal. In Table 5.1 we
observe the following features:
• Detection Technique 1: The first detection method makes use of the symbol received
and the sign of the correlation value. This method correlates and accumulates both along
the B bits received. Against an authentic signal this method shows In all the cases a ratio
around 1, which means that the signal is authentic. Since both correlation values have
the same sign, the accumulation of thee values will give as a results a similar value, whose
ratio is about 1.
• Detection Technique 2: This method di↵ered from the last one in the use of the full
accumulated correlation value, instead of only the sign. The results against an authentic
signal shows again that the ratio should be about 1, as expected, since both values will be
similar in magnitude, since the signal has not been modified.
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45 40 35 30 45 40 35 30
5 0.9 1.09 0.83 0.80 0.98 1.10 0.99 0.90 0.98
10 1.8 1.00 0.79 0.86 0.95 1.02 0.85 0.96 0.97
15 2.7 1,00 0.86 1.01 0.94 1.03 0.89 0.98 0.95
20 3.7 0.95 0.96 1,00 0.96 1.05 0.95 0.95 1.03
50 9.2 0.99 0.97 1.03 0.95 1.01 1.01 1.00 0.94
100 18.3 0.97 1.02 0.96 0.94 1.00 1.02 1.07 0.9
200 36.7 0.99 1.01 1.06 0.98 1.01 1.02 1.03 0.93
400 73.3 1.00 1.02 0.96 1.01 1.00 1,00 0.98 0.91
600 110 1.00 1.01 0.99 0.99 1.00 1.02 0.96 0.97
1000 146.7 1.00 1.01 0.98 0.94 1.00 1,00 0.98 0.92
1200 220 1.00 1.01 1,00 0.93 1.00 1,00 0.98 0.99
1500 275 1.00 1.01 0.98 0.93 1.00 1,00 1,00 0.97
3000 550 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 1.01 0.99
5 0.9 1.02 1.05 1.02 1.08 1.05 1.03 1.07 0.96
10 1.8 0.95 1.05 1.06 0.96 1.00 1.08 1.04 0.97
15 2.7 1,00 1.03 1.03 0.95 1.04 1.05 1.08 0.94
20 3.7 1.00 1.02 1.03 0.94 0.99 1.05 1.08 1.01
50 9.2 0.97 0.99 0.99 0.95 1.02 0.98 0.98 0.92
100 18.3 0.98 0.97 1.05 0.97 0.98 0.96 0.98 0.88
200 36.7 0.98 0.94 1.01 1.02 0.98 0.95 1.01 0.92
400 73.3 1.00 0.99 1.05 0.94 1.00 0.98 1.02 0.91
600 110 1.00 1.01 1.01 0.96 0.99 0.98 1.01 0.98
1000 146.7 1.00 1.00 1.02 0.94 0.98 0.97 1.00 0.94
1200 220 1.00 1.00 1.02 0.95 0.99 0.97 1.00 0.95
1500 275 1.00 1.00 1.01 0.94 0.99 0.97 1.00 0.97
3000 550 1.00 1.00 1.01 1.02 0.99 0.98 1.00 1.01
5 0.9 1.05 1.04 1.03 1.05 1.03 1.08 1.08 0.95
10 1.8 0.94 1.05 1.02 0.9 1.04 1.11 0.88 0.94
15 2.7 0.90 1.04 1.03 0.97 0.97 1.08 0.97 0.97
20 3.7 0.93 1.01 1.01 0.97 0.99 1.14 0.96 1.02
50 9.2 1.01 0.98 0.98 0.95 1.00 0.98 1.03 0.90
100 18.3 0.99 0.95 0.96 0.94 0.99 0.97 0.94 0.88
200 36.7 0.99 0.98 0.93 1.03 1.00 0.99 0.96 0.90
400 73.3 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.90 1.00 0.97 0.95 0.90
600 110 1.00 1.00 1.03 0.95 1.01 0.98 0.99 0.98
1000 146.7 1.00 1.01 1.01 0.88 1.00 0.99 0.99 0.93
1200 220 1.00 1.00 1.02 0.94 1.00 0.99 1.00 0.97
1500 275 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.94 1.00 0.99 1.00 0.98
3000 550 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.02 1.00 0.99 1.01 1.00
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5.2 Performance Results Against Counterfeit Signals
In this section the results for the di↵erent detection techniques described in Chapter 4 against
the attack strategies described in Chapter 3 are depicted. In each one of the Tables 5.2 -5.4 and
5.6 - 5.8 the same parameters are considered as the used in Section 5.1, except that in this case
is added a new one, which is named attacker C/No. This attacker C/No represents the C/No
level of the signal received by the spoofer. Depending on this value, the spoofer will be able to
estimate the received symbols quicker or slower, such as is described in Section 3.4.
Each value in the Tables 5.2 -5.4 and 5.6 - 5.8 match to a di↵erent simulation that corresponds
to a certain level of Spoofer C/No, victim C/No and victim observation time. Each value is
plotted in three di↵erent colours, depending on the detection performance achieved. This is
done in order to make the tables more readable. Red values mean that in such cases cannot
be determined the presence or not presence of spoofer in the signal. This means that in the
conditions with red numbers, the spoofer could not be detected. Orange means that there is
only slightly di↵erences between the results with and without spoofer, and that thus it is highly
probable to consider a real signal when it is a counterfeit signal and the other way around.
Finally, the green values mean that the spoofer can be detected with a high degree of success.
5.2.1 Detection Technique 1: Total Sign Correlation Ratio Detection Tech-
nique Results
In Tables 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4 the results against the attack Chip-By-Chip Estimation, Bit Guess
Estimation and FEA attack, respectively, are summarized against the Total Sign Correlation
Ratio Detection Technique. In such Tables, the mean of the Gaussian PDF obtained after
applying the process described in Section 4.1 is shown. The values of sigma σ2 are not present
in Tables 5.2-5.4, since they are all very similar (between 0.3 and 0.01, depending on the window
length used (σ2 is lower as the window length becomes larger).
Table 5.2 summarizes the results against the attack Chip-By-Chip Estimation. The victim
is able to detect the attack even when the attacker is well placed (and has a high C/No) and
his estimation is very quick. In this case the victim can detect the attack during approximately
the first 50 µs. During this time the ratio falls to about 0.1, instead of 1 when the signal is
authentic. At the same time that the spoofer C/No gets lower, the observation time by which
the victim is able to detect the attack gets larger. For example when the attacker C/No is 40
dB-Hz, the victim has about 70 µs to detect te attack. When the attacker C/No is the lowest
of the considered, the victim is able to detect the attack during almost 1000 µs. Considering
that it takes 100 µs about to estimate the bit an attacker with 30 dB-Hz of C/No, the attack
can be detected far beyond the modified samples. Looking at Table 5.2 we observe that in
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general, the best window length the victim uses is the one that stores the full amount of time
where the spoofer still does not know which polarity should send, since the bit has still not been
estimated correctly, and the attacker is sending both at the same time (some samples with one
polarity, and some other samples with the other). This occurs because when the victim stores
the full unsteady transmission of the spoofer, the summation of the samples are minimum and
the samples are practically compensated one each other (since the mean value is asymptotically
close zero). So the ratio between the first an last samples is minimum. On the contrary, if the
selected window goes far beyond the spoofer unsteady transmission, the spoofer e↵ect starts to
disappear because the victim stores more steady samples with the correct bit than unsteady ones.
In addition, looking at Table 5.2 we do not observe too much di↵erences between having 1 or 6
satellites in the signal. So the cross-correlation e↵ects does not a↵ects too much the detection
performance. The di↵erences between having 1 or 6 satellites turns out into an increase of the
ratio lower than 0.1.
Table 5.3 gathers the detection results against attack strategy Bit Guess Estimation. This
method shows similar results compared with the detection performance obtained against the
Chip-By-Chip Estimation strategy showed in Table 5.2.
Finally, Table 5.4 shows the results of this detection method against FEA. By looking at
the results superficially, we observe that the detection performance is not very high. The main
problem with this attack and detection technique is that we are only taking the sign of the
correlation values, disregarding the amplitude. So we are losing some valuable information,
more important in this attack than in the others. We also observe that this time the ratios are
much larger than 1. The reason of it is because during the FEA attacks, the attacker increases
the amplitude of the following bit after each incorrect guessed symbol (only during the beginning
of the symbol, see Section 3.2.4 for more details). As the spoofer increases the amplitude of
some symbols (and this is more pronounced after consecutive wrong guesses), when the ratio
between the first and last samples is computed, the result is higher than 1. The reason is because
the first samples value will be much larger than the last samples value, due to the increase in
amplitude of the first samples. With this method, the spoofer e↵ects are larger compared with
the other two detection methods, due to the big increase in amplitude during the first samples
of some symbols after consecutive bit wrong guesses.
Table 5.5 shows a brief comparison between the performance results with detection method
3. In this comparison has only been taken into account the case when 6 satellites are present
in the signal and for 45 dB/Hz and 30 dB/Hz of C/No. Table 5.5 that attacks 1 and 2 are the
easiest to detect, and are also detectable during more time.
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45 40 35 30 45 40 35 30 45 40 35 30
Samples
Time	
(!s)
5 0.9 0.16 0.15 0.19 0.29 0.13 0.17 0.22 0.31 0.16 0.18 0.23 0.33
10 1.8 0.12 0.14 0.14 0.18 0.13 0.16 0.16 0.24 0.15 0.17 0.19 0.27
15 2.7 0.09 0.12 0.14 0.16 0.11 0.15 0.15 0.19 0.11 0.16 0.18 0.18
20 3.7 0.04 0.10 0.13 0.14 0.08 0.12 0.14 0.13 0.08 0.14 0.16 0.15
50 9.2 0.89 0.87 0.60 0.49 0.90 0.85 0.80 0.79 0.88 0.84 0.64 0.83
100 18.3 0.99 1.04 0.78 0.78 0.97 0.99 0.88 1.01 0.96 0.94 0.85 0.95
200 36.7 1.01 0.99 0.86 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 1.03 1.01 0.95 0.99 0.99
400 73.3 1.00 1.02 0.99 0.96 1.00 1.03 0.99 1.04 1.00 0.99 1.00 0.97
600 110 1.00 1.01 1.01 1.07 1.00 1.01 0.96 1.07 1.00 1.00 1.02 0.97
1000 146.7 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.11 1.00 1.01 1,00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.98 0.98
1200 220 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.08 1.00 1.00 1.01 1.02 1.00 1.00 1.01 1.00
1500 275 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.06 1.00 1.00 1.02 1.02 1.00 1.00 1.01 1.00
3000 550 1.00 1.00 1.01 1.01 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.01 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.04
5 0.9 0.09 0.13 0.19 0.26 0.12 0.17 0.22 0.29 0.11 0.18 0.28 0.33
10 1.8 0.12 0.13 0.18 0.19 0.10 0.15 0.16 0.27 0.07 0.18 0.21 0.31
15 2.7 0.10 0.06 0.13 0.17 0.05 0.13 0.15 0.23 0.05 0.11 0.17 0.27
20 3.7 0.08 0.05 0.13 0.16 0.06 0.10 0.13 0.19 0.06 0.07 0.15 0.24
50 9.2 0.03 0.05 0.11 0.14 0.07 0.05 0.07 0.17 0.04 0.03 0.14 0.21
100 18.3 0.44 0.42 0.49 0.30 0.44 0.32 0.30 0.37 0.40 0.29 0.28 0.43
200 36.7 0.87 0.74 0.82 0.61 0.87 0.71 0.66 0.62 0.83 0.77 0.64 0.70
400 73.3 0.98 0.88 0.90 0.89 0.98 0.90 0.90 0.86 0.98 0.92 0.89 0.89
600 110 1.00 0.97 0.97 0.94 1.00 0.95 0.96 0.94 1.00 0.95 0.94 0.98
1000 146.7 1.00 0.99 1.02 0.99 1.00 0.99 0.97 0.98 1.00 0.98 0.94 0.99
1200 220 1.00 0.99 1.00 1.03 1.00 1,00 0.97 0.99 1.00 1.00 0.97 1.02
1500 275 1.00 1.00 1.01 1.02 1.00 1,00 0.99 0.99 1.00 1.00 0.96 1.01
3000 550 1.00 1.00 1.01 1.00 1.00 1,00 1,00 1.02 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99
5 0.9 0.08 0.13 0.15 0.22 0.09 0.16 0.17 0.25 0.13 0.29 0.33 0.38
10 1.8 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.18 0.06 0.15 0.16 0.22 0.06 0.16 0.26 0.36
15 2.7 0.13 0.08 0.1 0.18 0.06 0.15 0.15 0.19 0.04 0.15 0.22 0.35
20 3.7 0.09 0.07 0.09 0.16 0.04 0.11 0.12 0.18 0.02 0.14 0.17 0.29
50 9.2 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.15 0.04 0.10 0.11 0.16 0.02 0.13 0.14 0.17
100 18.3 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.13 0.03 0.08 0.10 0.11 0,00 0.11 0.07 0.01
200 36.7 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.12 0.02 0.08 0.05 0.07 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.02
400 73.3 0.79 0.67 0.52 0.45 0.83 0.73 0.63 0.48 0.82 0.66 0.60 0.58
600 110 0.96 0.97 0.75 0.63 0.98 0.98 0.78 0.67 0.96 0.86 0.74 0.68
1000 146.7 0.99 0.99 0.93 0.79 1.00 1.0 0.90 0.80 1.00 0.97 0.86 0.78
1200 220 1.01 0.99 0.96 0.82 1.00 0.99 0.93 0.87 1.00 0.99 0.91 0.82
1500 275 0.98 1.02 0.95 0.81 1.00 1.00 0.95 0.90 1.00 1.00 0.93 0.89
3000 550 0.99 1.00 0.99 0.93 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.97 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.94
5 0.9 0.07 0.15 0.24 0.33 0.07 0.18 0.27 0.35 0.07 0.19 0.29 0.32
10 1.8 0.1 0.12 0.20 0.29 0.14 0.17 0.23 0.30 0.05 0.14 0.28 0.31
15 2.7 0.04 0.11 0.17 0.26 0.07 0.15 0.21 0.27 0.06 0.07 0.25 0.28
20 3.7 0.04 0.08 0.12 0.22 0.06 0.16 0.17 0.24 0.06 0.04 0.21 0.20
50 9.2 0.03 0.08 0.07 0.18 0.04 0.11 0.12 0.18 0.05 0.05 0.18 0.20
100 18.3 0.04 0.03 0.09 0.16 0.03 0.06 0.10 0.18 0.04 0.04 0.11 0.14
200 36.7 0.02 0.05 0.06 0.15 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.16 0.04 0.05 0.07 0.10
400 73.3 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.12 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.14 0.04 0.03 0.08 0.08
600 110 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.10 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.13 0.04 0.02 0.08 0.07
1000 146.7 0.92 0.70 0.49 0.46 0.91 0.66 0.50 0.49 0.91 0.67 0.56 0.82
1200 220 0.99 0.86 0.60 0.72 0.98 0.81 0.64 0.91 0.97 0.83 0.66 0.86
1500 275 1.00 0.95 0.76 0.95 1.00 0.94 0.75 0.97 1.00 0.91 0.75 0.88
3000 550 1.00 1.00 0.96 0.98 1.00 1.00 0.96 0.99 1.00 1.00 0.96 0.95
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Table 5.2: Results of the Bit Sign Correlation Detection Technique against attack Chip-By-Chip Esti-
mation strategy.
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45 40 35 30 45 40 35 30 45 40 35 30
Samples
Time	
(!s)
5 0.9 0.13 0.17 0.23 0.22 0.12 0.19 0.21 0.23 0.08 0.2 0.23 0.23
10 1.8 0.10 0.14 0.18 0.17 0.11 0.18 0.19 0.17 0.12 0.18 0.19 0.19
15 2.7 0.10 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.08 0.15 0.17 0.16 0.10 0.16 0.18 0.18
20 3.7 0.08 0.11 0.09 0.15 0.07 0.14 0.11 0.15 0.09 0.15 0.14 0.15
50 9.2 0.88 0.94 0.56 0.78 0.85 0.80 0.57 0.77 0.92 0.88 0.60 0.79
100 18.3 0.94 0.98 0.65 0.88 0.96 0.93 0.72 0.8 0.96 0.91 0.81 0.85
200 36.7 0.97 1.00 0.84 0.96 0.98 0.98 0.89 1.02 1,00 0.97 0.95 0.84
400 73.3 0.98 1.03 0.97 0.99 0.98 1.01 0.94 1.03 0.99 1,00 0.99 0.91
600 110 0.98 1.00 0.99 1.03 0.98 1.00 0.94 1.01 1.00 1.01 1.01 0.91
1000 146.7 0.99 1.00 0.98 1.04 0.99 1.01 0.98 1.01 1.00 1.01 1.01 0.94
1200 220 0.99 1.01 0.98 1.02 1.00 1.00 0.99 1.01 0.99 1.01 1.00 0.96
1500 275 0.99 1.01 0.99 1.02 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 1.00 1.01 1.00 0.98
3000 550 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.01 1.00 1.00 1.01 0.99 1.00 1.01 0.99 1.00
5 0.9 0.11 0.21 0.21 0.18 0.13 0.18 0.19 0.21 0.12 0.18 0.28 0.26
10 1.8 0.10 0.16 0.16 0.18 0.08 0.17 0.14 0.18 0.07 0.04 0.17 0.23
15 2.7 0.09 0.12 0.11 0.16 0.07 0.13 0.14 0.17 0.05 0.08 0.18 0.22
20 3.7 0.08 0.12 0.10 0.13 0.04 0.07 0.13 0.15 0.04 0.07 0.18 0.18
50 9.2 0.01 0.07 0.12 0.11 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.12 0.02 0.03 0.14 0.15
100 18.3 0.33 0.36 0.39 0.43 0.35 0.32 0.32 0.53 0.32 0.30 0.34 0.57
200 36.7 0.65 0.68 0.76 0.79 0.68 0.65 0.60 0.77 0.67 0.70 0.63 0.78
400 73.3 0.82 0.82 0.87 0.87 0.85 0.81 0.82 0.89 0.83 0.83 0.85 0.89
600 110 0.88 0.88 0.93 0.93 0.89 0.87 0.88 0.95 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.97
1000 146.7 0.93 0.92 0.99 0.99 0.94 0.92 0.96 0.98 0.92 0.93 0.91 0.99
1200 220 0.94 0.93 0.98 0.98 0.95 0.93 0.98 1.01 0.94 0.94 0.93 1.02
1500 275 0.95 0.95 0.98 1.01 0.96 0.95 0.98 1.02 0.94 0.95 0.94 1,00
3000 550 0.97 0.96 1.00 1.00 0.98 0.97 0.99 0.99 0.98 0.97 0.98 0.99
5 0.9 0.08 0.18 0.19 0.18 0.11 0.21 0.21 0.23 0.09 0.23 0.20 0.25
10 1.8 0.07 0.12 0.16 0.17 0.08 0.15 0.18 0.20 0.03 0.13 0.16 0.24
15 2.7 0.11 0.10 0.15 0.15 0.06 0.10 0.17 0.18 0.02 0.10 0.16 0.23
20 3.7 0.09 0.09 0.12 0.12 0.04 0.09 0.14 0.17 0.02 0.09 0.15 0.21
50 9.2 0.08 0.08 0.10 0.09 0.02 0.08 0.11 0.16 0.01 0.08 0.08 0.10
100 18.3 0.09 0.07 0.11 0.07 0.02 0.08 0.08 0.09 0,00 0.07 0.08 0.03
200 36.7 0.08 0,00 0.05 0.10 0,00 0.07 0.03 0.06 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.11
400 73.3 0.49 0.46 0.50 0.49 0.50 0.53 0.52 0.52 0.51 0.53 0.53 0.57
600 110 0.67 0.71 0.69 0.66 0.66 0.75 0.68 0.63 0.66 0.68 0.70 0.71
1000 146.7 0.79 0.83 0.83 0.79 0.8 0.86 0.8 0.77 0.80 0.81 0.82 0.79
1200 220 0.81 0.91 0.86 0.80 0.83 0.92 0.84 0.81 0.83 0.85 0.83 0.83
1500 275 0.87 0.98 0.87 0.82 0.86 0.98 0.86 0.83 0.87 0.88 0.86 0.87
3000 550 0.94 1.01 0.94 0.9 0.93 0.97 0.95 0.92 0.94 0.93 0.93 0.92
5 0.9 0.07 0.08 0,00 0.13 0.08 0.053 0.07 0,00 0.07 0.05 0.131 0.15
10 1.8 0.06 0.05 0.028 0.1 0.11 0.07 0.17 0,00 0.03 0.07 0.12 0.14
15 2.7 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.14 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.06 0.08
20 3.7 0.04 0.09 0.017 0.08 0.07 0.14 0.09 0.10 0.03 0.02 0.06 0.09
50 9.2 0.02 0.04 0.12 0.08 0.04 0.08 0.1 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.12
100 18.3 0.01 0.04 0.07 0.06 0.02 0.06 0.02 0.10 0.02 0.04 0.08 0.06
200 36.7 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.07 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.07
400 73.3 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.06 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.07
600 110 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.07 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.06
1000 146.7 0.41 0.39 0.39 0.67 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.67 0.40 0.40 0.43 0.79
1200 220 0.51 0.49 0.48 0.78 0.50 0.49 0.49 0.90 0.50 0.50 0.52 0.82
1500 275 0.61 0.59 0.59 0.89 0.60 0.59 0.59 0.92 0.59 0.60 0.60 0.84
3000 550 0.81 0.79 0.79 0.95 0.80 0.79 0.81 0.95 0.8 0.79 0.81 0.92
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Table 5.3: Results of the Bit Sign Correlation Detection Technique against Bit-Guess Estimation strat-
egy.
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45 40 35 30 45 40 35 30 45 40 35 30
Samples
Time	
(!s)
5 0.9 2.22 3.22 3.16 2.87 2.59 3.45 3.76 3.07 2.33 4.17 4.91 2.48
10 1.8 1.79 2.44 5.28 3.69 1.96 2.88 2.53 3.08 1.84 3.91 3.78 3.04
15 2.7 1.62 2.07 4.42 3.53 1.85 2.33 2.17 3.69 1.63 3.88 4.12 2.49
20 3.7 1.44 2.29 3.60 2.78 1.59 2.34 2.12 3.10 1.63 4.38 4.48 2.59
50 9.2 1.21 1.73 2.22 2.25 1.24 1.66 1.88 2.79 1.23 2.05 2.15 1.62
100 18.3 1.07 1.29 1.76 1.6 1.09 1.28 1.76 1.49 1.08 1.67 1.65 1.39
200 36.7 1.02 1.16 1.31 1.42 1.03 1.15 1.5 1.35 1.02 1.22 1.65 1.34
400 73.3 1.00 1.07 1.18 1.21 1.00 1.05 1.27 1.14 1.01 1.05 1.24 1.21
600 110 1.00 1.02 1.11 1.13 1.00 1.02 1.21 1.09 1.00 1.03 1.12 1.11
1000 146.7 1.00 1.01 1.08 1.09 1.00 1.01 1.18 1.04 1.00 1.01 1.03 1.03
1200 220 1.00 1.00 1.04 1.06 1.00 1.00 1.13 1.02 1.00 1.01 1.03 1.00
1500 275 1.00 1.00 1.03 1.04 1.00 1.00 1.04 1.03 1.00 1.00 1.01 1.00
3000 550 1.00 1.00 1.01 1.02 1.00 1.00 1.04 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.02 1.00
5 0.9 2.49 3.86 4.38 3.83 3.24 3.25 3.63 3.81 3.34 4.88 4.23 3.11
10 1.8 2.01 3.35 4.49 3.89 1.93 3.13 4.28 3.75 2.06 3.22 3.35 3.60
15 2.7 1.64 2.71 4.16 3.06 1.62 3.43 3.98 3.11 1.74 4.33 4.26 3.15
20 3.7 1.52 2.27 4.04 4.65 1.45 2.55 3.73 4.18 1.57 2.84 3.83 4.07
50 9.2 1.17 1.65 2.34 2.88 1.27 1.90 2.83 3.09 1.38 1.72 2.29 4.45
100 18.3 1.06 1.41 1.80 2.24 1.08 1.42 1.89 2.92 1.12 1.47 1.60 3.79
200 36.7 1.02 1.17 1.39 1.59 1.02 1.18 1.66 2.09 1.09 1.17 1.46 1.91
400 73.3 1.00 1.06 1.16 1.48 1,00 1.06 1.34 1.37 1.03 1.06 1.12 1.54
600 110 1.00 1.02 1.09 1.27 1,00 1.03 1.15 1.26 1.03 1.02 1.12 1.34
1000 146.7 1.00 1,00 1.04 1.12 0.99 1.01 1.09 1.12 1.00 1.01 1.06 1.26
1200 220 1.00 1.00 1.02 1.13 0.99 1.00 1.06 1.08 1.00 1.00 1.06 1.25
1500 275 1.00 1.00 1.01 1.06 0.99 1.00 1.04 1.06 1.00 1.00 1.03 1.16
3000 550 1.00 1.00 1.01 1.00 0.99 1.00 1.01 1.03 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.04
5 0.9 2.20 3.64 4.12 3.37 2.40 3.76 4.17 3.45 2.76 3.72 3.67 3.31
10 1.8 1.83 2.6 4.01 3.94 1.79 2.68 4.08 3.88 2.10 3.28 3.98 3.62
15 2.7 1.73 2.54 2.75 2.87 1.71 2.61 2.86 2.75 1.88 3.40 2.50 2.69
20 3.7 1.54 1.93 2.44 2.35 1.63 2.01 2.48 2.43 1.62 3.01 3.02 2.58
50 9.2 1.25 1.69 2.30 2.07 1.30 1.83 2.37 2.18 1.28 1.92 2.23 2.16
100 18.3 1.10 1.36 2.17 2.02 1.12 1.41 2.21 2.12 1.10 1.58 1.73 2.10
200 36.7 1.03 1.17 1.47 1.93 1.04 1.18 1.62 1.98 1.01 1.24 1.51 1.93
400 73.3 1.00 1.09 1.22 1.62 1.00 1.12 1.33 1.65 1,00 1.08 1.16 1.60
600 110 1.00 1.04 1.18 1.37 1.00 1.09 1.24 1.42 1,00 1.04 1.12 1.38
1000 146.7 1.00 1.01 1.09 1.24 1.00 1.02 1.11 1.27 0.99 1.00 1.04 1.20
1200 220 1.00 1.00 1.08 1.23 1.00 1.07 1.09 1.25 0.99 1.00 1.04 1.22
1500 275 1.00 1.00 1.06 1.16 1.00 1.03 1.03 1.15 0.99 1.00 1.01 1.12
3000 550 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.07 1.00 1,00 0.99 1.05 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.02
5 0.9 2.27 7.21 1.59 3.42 2.35 6.71 1.80 3.55 2.91 3.04 1.83 3.42
10 1.8 1.95 5.12 3.66 3.31 1.80 3.38 2.80 3.14 2.11 2.49 2.67 3.08
15 2.7 1.69 3.03 4.60 2.45 1.71 2.23 3.63 2.75 1.95 2.09 2.78 2.54
20 3.7 1.63 2.38 3.67 2.03 1.63 2.25 3.45 2.16 2.00 2.35 3.27 2.24
50 9.2 1.28 1.67 2.33 1.97 1.31 1.57 2.39 2.06 1.44 1.56 2.65 2.11
100 18.3 1.13 1.53 1.83 1.99 1.12 1.31 1.75 2.20 1.26 1.42 1.87 2.17
200 36.7 1.04 1.22 1.51 1.86 1.04 1.16 1.43 1.92 1.10 1.19 1.49 1.86
400 73.3 1.00 1.08 1.32 1.74 0.99 1.03 1.31 1.71 1.02 1.09 1.34 1.77
600 110 1.00 1.04 1.20 1.68 0.99 1,00 1.22 1.61 1.00 1.03 1.27 1.63
1000 146.7 0.99 1.00 1.13 1.50 0.99 0.98 1.11 1.4 0.99 1.02 1.14 1.37
1200 220 0.99 0.99 1.07 1.42 0.99 0.98 1.04 1.37 0.99 1.01 1.09 1.21
1500 275 0.99 1.00 1.05 1.28 0.99 0.97 1.02 1.25 0.99 1.00 1.04 1.11
3000 550 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.15 0.99 0.98 1.03 1.11 0.99 1.00 0.99 1.01
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Table 5.4: Results of the detection method 2 against FEA attack.
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Attack	1 Attack	2 Attack	3 Attack	1 Attack	2 Attack	3
Best	Case	Difference 0.92 0.85 0.57 0.85 0.75 0.67
Worst	Case	Difference 0.84 0.44 0.19 0.77 0.48 0.17
Maximum	Time	Detectable	(!s) 20 50 50 50 50 400
Minimum	Time	Detectable	(!s) 5 5 5 5 5 5
Best	Case	Difference 0.96 0.99 0.66 0.93 0.84 0.71
Worst	Case	Difference 0.93 0.46 0.21 0.68 0.43 0.17
Maximum	Time	Detectable	(!s) 600 1200 100 1200 1500 1200
Minimum	Time	Detectable	(!s) 5 5 5 5 5 5
Victim	C/No
45	dB-Hz 30	dB-Hz
A
tt
a
ck
e
r	
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o
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5
	d
B
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0
	d
B
-H
z
Table 5.5: Comparison results with Detection Method 1. The results corresponds when 6 satellites are
present in the signal.
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5.2.2 Detection Technique 2: Total Correlation Ratio Detection Technique
Results
In Tables 5.6, 5.7 and 5.8 the results against the three considered attack strategies are summa-
rized when the Total Correlation Ratio detection technique is carried out. The main di↵erence
of using this detection method instead the last one is the fact that in this case is used the full
correlation value instead of only the sign information. In this occasion sigma σ2 was between
0.01 and 0.05 .
Table 5.6 shows the obtained results against the attack strategy Chip-By-Chip Estimation.
Table 5.6 shows excellent results against this attack. This method shows as the attack can be
detected with enough certainty in any condition of victim C/No and number of satellites. Even
when the spoofer has high C/No, the victim is able to detect the spoofer. In addition, the attack
can be detected after the spoofer is transmitting the correct bit. The minimum values reached
with this method are practically zero. From only taking 0.9 µs of signal, the spoofer can be
detected with enough certainty, since the mean obtained is about 0.1. Taking more samples of
spoofing attack, this values decreases to 0.01, since more samples are available to carry out the
correlation.
Table 5.7 shows the results against the attack strategy Bit-Guess Estimation. Looking at
Table 5.7 we can observe as, in general, the results are quite similar as the shown in Table 5.7
in last Section. Although using the full information of the correlation value the performance is
slightly better (the ratios where the spoofer can be detected are lower and closer to zero). The
values are about 0.1 lower in practically all the cases. In addition, the ratio does not recovers
so quickly to 1 after the attack. So the victim has a little bit more time to detect the spoofer.
Finally, in Table 5.8 the results against the FEA attack are shown. Total Correlation Ratio
Detection Technique behaves excellent against FEA attacks. Superficially the results are quite
similar as the shown against the other attacks. Although the ratio is slightly higher (around
0.2), but only when short observation window lengths are used. In addition, the window lengths
number by which the victim can detect the spoofer has increased compared with the other two
attacks. This is due to the fact that this method modifies more severely the amplitudes (above
all after consecutive wrong guesses) than with the other two methods. So to return the nminal
value it needs more time, since the di↵erence in amplitude between both edges of the bit will be
greater.
Table 5.9 shows a brief comparison between the performance results with detection method
3. In this comparison has only been taken into account the case when 6 satellites are present
in the signal and for 45 dB/Hz and 30 dB/Hz of C/No. Table 5.9 shows that the easiest attack
method to detect is the strategy 1 and 2, but not too far from the 3. On the contrary, the
strategy attack 3 can be detected during more time.
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45 40 35 30 45 40 35 30 45 40 35 30
Samples
Time	
(!s)
5 0.9 0.17 0.15 0.16 0.20 0.18 0.15 0.15 0.21 0.18 0.18 0.16 0.23
10 1.8 0.11 0.13 0.13 0.19 0.13 0.14 0.12 0.18 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.19
15 2.7 0.08 0.08 0.11 0.18 0.10 0.10 0.12 0.16 0.11 0.12 0.14 0.18
20 3.7 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.15 0.08 0.09 0.11 0.15 0.09 0.08 0.12 0.17
50 9.2 0.58 0.55 0.57 0.67 0.59 0.58 0.59 0.69 0.59 0.59 0.60 0.69
100 18.3 0.87 0.88 0.77 0.83 0.93 0.94 0.91 0.89 0.94 0.96 0.86 0.77
200 36.7 0.98 0.96 0.89 0.94 0.97 1.00 0.94 0.96 0.98 0.99 1.00 0.98
400 73.3 0.98 0.98 0.91 0.98 1.00 1.01 1.02 0.99 1.00 1.01 1.02 1.03
600 110 1.00 1.00 0.92 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.01 0.98 1.01 1.00 0.99 1.07
1000 146.7 1.00 1.00 0.94 0.94 0.99 1.01 1.01 1.02 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.07
1200 220 1.00 1.01 0.95 0.98 1.00 1.00 1.01 1.00 1.00 0.99 1.00 1.07
1500 275 1.00 1.02 0.96 0.95 0.99 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.98 1.04
3000 550 1.00 1.00 0.98 0.98 1.00 1.01 1.01 0.98 1.00 0.99 0.97 1.02
5 0.9 0.18 0.14 0.18 0.23 0.16 0.15 0.19 0.23 0.19 0.17 0.21 0.24
10 1.8 0.10 0.12 0.16 0.21 0.11 0.13 0.17 0.22 0.11 0.14 0.18 0.19
15 2.7 0.09 0.06 0.15 0.17 0.09 0.08 0.14 0.15 0.08 0.09 0.16 0.17
20 3.7 0.09 0.06 0.14 0.14 0.06 0.08 0.14 0.14 0.05 0.08 0.14 0.15
50 9.2 0.05 0.01 0.08 0.11 0.06 0.08 0.08 0.13 0.03 0.06 0.12 0.14
100 18.3 0.34 0.35 0.43 0.43 0.37 0.34 0.48 0.49 0.31 0.31 0.51 0.52
200 36.7 0.66 0.70 0.73 0.73 0.67 0.67 0.72 0.79 0.66 0.64 0.68 0.83
400 73.3 0.83 0.85 0.86 0.88 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.91 0.83 0.82 0.86 0.94
600 110 0.89 0.90 0.93 0.93 0.90 0.90 0.92 0.96 0.90 0.89 0.92 0.98
1000 146.7 0.93 0.93 0.92 0.92 0.94 0.94 0.95 0.99 0.93 0.95 0.95 1.02
1200 220 0.94 0.94 0.93 0.93 0.95 0.95 0.97 0.98 0.94 0.96 0.95 1.01
1500 275 0.95 0.95 0.94 0.94 0.95 0.96 0.97 1.02 0.95 0.97 0.96 1.00
3000 550 0.98 0.98 0.99 0.99 0.97 0.97 0.98 1.00 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.99
5 0.9 0.16 0.12 0.18 0.23 0.18 0.14 0.19 0.25 0.16 0.15 0.21 0.26
10 1.8 0.12 0.13 0.16 0.21 0.14 0.13 0.18 0.22 0.08 0.09 0.19 0.23
15 2.7 0.09 0.07 0.09 0.18 0.11 0.11 0.15 0.18 0.08 0.07 0.12 0.19
20 3.7 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.17 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.16 0.05 0.05 0.12 0.18
50 9.2 0.03 0.05 0.07 0.13 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.14 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.15
100 18.3 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.12 0.03 0.04 0.07 0.13 0.04 0.01 0.05 0.14
200 36.7 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.10 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.11 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.12
400 73.3 0.48 0.48 0.49 0.52 0.49 0.48 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.49 0.50 0.52
600 110 0.76 0.65 0.67 0.69 0.77 0.68 0.66 0.68 0.68 0.65 0.72 0.75
1000 146.7 0.92 0.80 0.80 0.86 0.95 0.86 0.78 0.83 0.81 0.80 0.85 0.85
1200 220 0.98 0.88 0.89 0.98 0.99 0.90 0.88 0.97 0.93 0.93 0.88 0.98
1500 275 0.99 0.97 0.96 0.99 0.99 0.98 0.94 0.99 0.99 0.96 0.97 0.98
3000 550 1.00 1.02 1.02 0.98 1.01 1.00 1.02 1.02 1.03 1.03 0.98 0.99
5 0.9 0.15 0.12 0.16 0.19 0.15 0.07 0.16 0.19 0.08 0.19 0.18 0.21
10 1.8 0.08 0.12 0.14 0.18 0.13 0.08 0.15 0.18 0.04 0.07 0.16 0.20
15 2.7 0.08 0.15 0.12 0.18 0.11 0.06 0.16 0.16 0.04 0.06 0.13 0.18
20 3.7 0.04 0.11 0.11 0.15 0.07 0.05 0.14 0.14 0.02 0.07 0.12 0.17
50 9.2 0.01 0.06 0.03 0.14 0.02 0.07 0.07 0.14 0.03 0.07 0.10 0.16
100 18.3 0.01 0.06 0.03 0.13 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.12 0.02 0.03 0.08 0.13
200 36.7 0.00 0.04 0.04 0.12 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.10 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.11
400 73.3 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.08 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.09 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.10
600 110 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.07 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.08 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.08
1000 146.7 0.39 0.41 0.40 0.46 0.41 0.43 0.44 0.48 0.44 0.46 0.47 0.49
1200 220 0.49 0.51 0.49 4.64 0.51 0.52 0.53 0.55 0.52 0.52 0.53 0.58
1500 275 0.59 0.61 0.61 0.69 0.65 0.66 0.67 0.69 0.66 0.67 0.68 0.71
3000 550 0.80 0.81 0.83 0.85 0.87 0.88 0.89 0.91 0.89 0.90 0.94 1.06
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Table 5.6: Results of the Correlation Amplitude Check Detection Technique against attack Chip-By-
Chip Estimation strategy.
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45 40 35 30 45 40 35 30 45 40 35 30
Samples
Time	
(!s)
5 0.9 0.17 0.15 0.16 0.2 0.18 0.15 0.15 0.21 0.18 0.18 0.16 0.23
10 1.8 0.11 0.13 0.13 0.19 0.13 0.14 0.12 0.18 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.19
15 2.7 0.08 0.08 0.11 0.18 0.1 0.1 0.12 0.16 0.11 0.12 0.14 0.18
20 3.7 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.15 0.08 0.09 0.11 0.15 0.09 0.08 0.12 0.17
50 9.2 0.58 0.55 0.57 0.67 0.59 0.58 0.59 0.69 0.59 0.59 0.6 0.69
100 18.3 0.87 0.88 0.77 0.83 0.93 0.94 0.91 0.89 0.94 0.96 0.86 0.77
200 36.7 0.98 0.96 0.89 0.94 0.97 1,00 0.94 0.96 0.98 0.99 1,00 0.98
400 73.3 0.98 0.98 0.91 0.98 1,00 1.01 1.02 0.99 1,00 1.01 1.02 1.03
600 110 1,00 1,00 0.92 0.99 1,00 1,00 1.01 0.98 1.01 1,00 0.99 1.07
1000 146.7 1,00 1,00 0.94 0.94 0.99 1.01 1.01 1.02 1,00 1,00 1,00 1.07
1200 220 1,00 1.01 0.95 0.98 1,00 1,00 1.01 1,00 1,00 0.99 1,00 1.07
1500 275 1,00 1.02 0.96 0.95 0.99 1,00 1,00 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.98 1.04
3000 550 1,00 1,00 0.98 0.98 1,00 1.01 1.01 0.98 1,00 0.99 0.97 1.02
5 0.9 0.18 0.14 0.18 0.23 0.16 0.15 0.19 0.23 0.19 0.17 0.21 0.24
10 1.8 0.1 0.12 0.16 0.21 0.11 0.13 0.17 0.22 0.11 0.14 0.18 0.19
15 2.7 0.09 0.06 0.15 0.17 0.09 0.08 0.14 0.15 0.08 0.09 0.16 0.17
20 3.7 0.09 0.06 0.14 0.14 0.06 0.08 0.14 0.14 0.05 0.08 0.14 0.15
50 9.2 0.05 0.01 0.08 0.11 0.06 0.08 0.08 0.13 0.03 0.06 0.12 0.14
100 18.3 0.34 0.35 0.43 0.43 0.37 0.34 0.48 0.49 0.31 0.31 0.51 0.52
200 36.7 0.66 0.7 0.73 0.73 0.67 0.67 0.72 0.79 0.66 0.64 0.68 0.83
400 73.3 0.83 0.85 0.86 0.88 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.91 0.83 0.82 0.86 0.94
600 110 0.89 0.9 0.93 0.93 0.9 0.9 0.92 0.96 0.9 0.89 0.92 0.98
1000 146.7 0.93 0.93 0.92 0.92 0.94 0.94 0.95 0.99 0.93 0.95 0.95 1.02
1200 220 0.94 0.94 0.93 0.93 0.95 0.95 0.97 0.98 0.94 0.96 0.95 1.01
1500 275 0.95 0.95 0.94 0.94 0.95 0.96 0.97 1.02 0.95 0.97 0.96 1,00
3000 550 0.98 0.98 0.99 0.99 0.97 0.97 0.98 1,00 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.99
5 0.9 0.16 0.12 0.18 0.23 0.18 0.14 0.19 0.25 0.16 0.15 0.21 0.26
10 1.8 0.12 0.13 0.16 0.21 0.14 0.13 0.18 0.22 0.08 0.09 0.19 0.23
15 2.7 0.09 0.07 0.09 0.18 0.11 0.11 0.15 0.18 0.08 0.07 0.12 0.19
20 3.7 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.17 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.16 0.05 0.05 0.12 0.18
50 9.2 0.03 0.05 0.07 0.13 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.14 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.15
100 18.3 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.12 0.03 0.04 0.07 0.13 0.04 0.01 0.05 0.14
200 36.7 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.1 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.11 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.12
400 73.3 0.48 0.48 0.49 0.52 0.49 0.48 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.49 0.5 0.52
600 110 0.76 0.65 0.67 0.69 0.77 0.678 0.66 0.68 0.68 0.65 0.72 0.75
1000 146.7 0.92 0.8 0.8 0.86 0.95 0.86 0.78 0.83 0.81 0.8 0.85 0.85
1200 220 0.98 0.88 0.89 0.98 0.99 0.9 0.88 0.97 0.93 0.93 0.88 0.98
1500 275 0.99 0.97 0.96 0.99 0.99 0.98 0.94 0.99 0.99 0.96 0.97 0.98
3000 550 1,00 1.02 1.02 0.98 1.01 1,00 1.02 1.02 1.03 1.03 0.98 0.99
5 0.9 0.15 0.12 0.164 0.19 0.15 0.07 0.16 0.19 0.08 0.19 0.18 0.21
10 1.8 0.08 0.12 0.14 0.18 0.13 0.08 0.15 0.18 0.04 0.07 0.16 0.2
15 2.7 0.08 0.15 0.12 0.18 0.11 0.06 0.16 0.16 0.04 0.06 0.13 0.18
20 3.7 0.04 0.11 0.11 0.15 0.07 0.05 0.14 0.14 0.02 0.07 0.12 0.17
50 9.2 0.01 0.06 0.03 0.14 0.02 0.07 0.07 0.14 0.03 0.07 0.1 0.16
100 18.3 0.01 0.06 0.03 0.13 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.12 0.02 0.03 0.08 0.13
200 36.7 0,00 0.04 0.04 0.12 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.1 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.11
400 73.3 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.08 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.09 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.1
600 110 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.07 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.08 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.08
1000 146.7 0.39 0.41 0.4 0.46 0.41 0.43 0.44 0.48 0.44 0.46 0.47 0.49
1200 220 0.49 0.51 0.49 4.64 0.51 0.52 0.53 0.55 0.52 0.52 0.53 0.58
1500 275 0.59 0.61 0.61 0.69 0.65 0.66 0.67 0.69 0.66 0.67 0.68 0.71
3000 550 0.8 0.81 0.83 0.85 0.87 0.88 0.89 0.91 0.89 0.9 0.94 1.06
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Table 5.7: Results of the Correlation Amplitude Check Detection Technique against Bit-Guess Estima-
tion strategy.
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45 40 35 30 45 40 35 30 45 40 35 30
Samples
Time	
(!s)
5 0.9 4.24 4.61 3.85 2.41 4.36 4.94 4.56 2.55 4.34 4.49 4.52 4.97
10 1.8 4.25 5.06 3.65 3.12 4.71 5.26 4.98 3.48 4.67 4.85 5.17 4.21
15 2.7 4.06 5.23 3.96 3.27 4.58 5.42 5.07 3.76 4.19 4.8 5.07 4.51
20 3.7 4.1 5.44 4.65 4.57 4.5 5.65 4.84 4.08 4.37 5.44 5.2 4.73
50 9.2 2.33 2.97 4.6 4.1 2.53 2.98 4.17 3.79 2.42 3.14 3.27 2.7
100 18.3 1.66 1.97 2.8 2.21 1.76 1.95 2.69 2.19 1.72 2.15 2.25 1.9
200 36.7 1.31 1.48 1.78 1.67 1.37 1.43 1.74 1.63 1.33 1.56 1.77 1.47
400 73.3 1.15 1.22 1.39 1.29 1.17 1.22 1.36 1.33 1.15 1.28 1.39 1.27
600 110 1.09 1.14 1.28 1.17 1.12 1.14 1.32 1.19 1.1 1.17 1.24 1.16
1000 146.7 1.05 1.08 1.19 1.09 1.06 1.08 1.22 1.15 1.05 1.1 1.12 1.09
1200 220 1.04 1.06 1.16 1.05 1.05 1.06 1.21 1.13 1.04 1.1 1.11 1.06
1500 275 1.04 1.04 1.12 1.03 1.04 1.05 1.15 1.1 1.04 1.07 1.09 1.05
3000 550 1.01 1,00 1.05 1.02 1.01 1.02 1.1 1.06 1.01 1.03 1.05 1.03
5 0.9 5.27 4.07 4.01 4.02 4.96 4.27 4.52 4.23 5.01 4.14 3.45 4.39
10 1.8 4.54 5.9 6.51 2.91 4.34 5.87 6.03 3.91 5.37 5.37 4.27 4.63
15 2.7 4.41 5.59 5.46 2.36 4.21 5.97 5.71 4.3 5.25 5.6 4.33 4.3
20 3.7 4.2 5.26 5.58 4.05 4.01 5.98 4.76 4.99 5.19 5.69 5.66 4.99
50 9.2 4.34 4.94 5.6 4.21 4.01 5.58 5.61 5.14 5.76 5.39 6.04 5.01
100 18.3 3.18 3.77 4.18 4.95 3.04 3.99 6.01 6.05 3.99 3.81 4.66 6.48
200 36.7 2.06 2.37 2.49 3.16 1.97 2.4 3.21 3.31 2.4 2.35 2.73 3.03
400 73.3 1.52 1.68 1.72 1.97 1.47 1.68 2.09 2.09 1.68 1.66 1.81 2.1
600 110 1.35 1.45 1.51 1.65 1.33 1.46 1.68 1.69 1.45 1.44 1.57 1.7
1000 146.7 1.2 1.27 1.28 1.37 1.18 1.28 1.41 1.37 1.27 1.27 1.34 1.44
1200 220 1.16 1.22 1.25 1.3 1.16 1.23 1.34 1.29 1.22 1.23 1.29 1.36
1500 275 1.13 1.17 1.19 1.22 1.12 1.18 1.27 1.25 1.19 1.18 1.23 1.3
3000 550 1.05 1.07 1.09 1.11 1.04 1.09 1.15 1.11 1.1 1.08 1.11 1.13
5 0.9 4.48 4.28 4.99 2.78 3.94 4.93 4.46 2.87 4.11 5.05 6.8 2.49
10 1.8 4.41 4.42 5.3 3.1 4.16 4.45 5.12 3.07 4,00 5.71 6.4 2.78
15 2.7 4.46 4.66 5.24 4.19 4.22 4.57 5.36 3.58 3.98 5.41 5.04 2.55
20 3.7 4.42 4.46 5.26 4.16 4.45 4.87 5.87 4.12 3.93 5.3 5.28 2.96
50 9.2 4.48 4.46 5.85 5.66 4.21 4.26 4.78 5.8 4.05 4.86 5.19 2.68
100 18.3 4.42 4.62 5.73 5.37 4.16 4.79 4.59 5.57 3.98 4.87 5.19 3.12
200 36.7 4.48 4.55 5.67 6.09 4.17 5.03 5.03 5.27 3.94 4.84 5.23 3.15
400 73.3 2.73 2.79 3.25 3.63 2.52 3.33 4.87 3.3 2.47 2.88 3.17 3.78
600 110 2.15 2.19 2.54 2.69 2,00 2.53 5.04 2.55 1.97 2.26 2.46 3.54
1000 146.7 1.68 1.7 1.91 1.98 1.59 1.92 3.28 1.9 1.55 1.75 1.83 3.21
1200 220 1.56 1.58 1.77 1.83 1.49 1.78 2.95 1.74 1.45 1.62 1.68 2.16
1500 275 1.44 1.47 1.61 1.66 1.39 1.64 2.66 1.56 1.35 1.49 1.54 1.87
3000 550 1.2 1.23 1.29 1.35 1.18 1.37 2.06 1.24 1.17 1.23 1.25 1.42
5 0.9 3.94 5.99 3.32 2.65 4.91 4.91 3.59 2.56 3.62 5.36 3.69 2.58
10 1.8 3.83 5.22 6.02 3.12 4.39 4.39 5.65 2.87 3.66 4.42 3.87 2.87
15 2.7 3.77 4.97 5.72 4.65 3.94 3.94 4.89 3.26 3.69 4.3 4.82 3.11
20 3.7 3.82 4.69 5.3 5.27 3.84 3.84 5.12 4.53 3.72 4.33 4.69 4.15
50 9.2 3.68 4.41 5.22 5.59 3.56 3.56 5.33 4.91 3.61 4.35 4.64 4.05
100 18.3 3.72 4.41 4.86 4.72 3.54 3.54 4.87 5.5 3.65 4.39 4.83 4.67
200 36.7 3.77 4.44 4.86 3.59 3.71 3.71 4.67 5.78 3.57 4.35 4.6 4.89
400 73.3 3.72 4.35 4.83 3.16 3.73 3.73 4.33 6.13 3.62 4.36 4.61 4.23
600 110 3.71 4.29 4.82 3.02 3.69 3.69 4.87 5.96 3.62 4.35 4.61 3.97
1000 146.7 2.6 2.96 3.29 2.26 2.6 2.6 3.27 4.09 2.57 3,00 3.11 4.04
1200 220 2.33 2.63 2.91 2.11 2.33 2.33 2.76 3.52 2.3 2.66 2.76 3.74
1500 275 2.06 2.31 2.54 1.65 2.06 2.06 2.27 3.06 2.05 2.35 2.43 2.79
3000 550 1.51 1.64 1.72 1.27 1.5 1.5 1.67 2.02 1.5 1.66 1.74 1.87
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Table 5.8: Results of the Correlation Amplitude Check Detection Technique against FEA attack.
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Attack	1 Attack	2 Attack	3 Attack	1 Attack	2 Attack	3
Best	Case	Difference 0.92 0.91 0.79 0.75 0.83 0.81
Worst	Case	Difference 0.88 0.41 0.25 0.15 0.31 0.21
Maximum	Time	Detectable	(!s) 20 50 200 200 100 400
Minimum	Time	Detectable	(!s) 5 5 5 5 5 5
Best	Case	Difference 0.99 0.99 0.73 0.94 0.92 0.82
Worst	Case	Difference 0.41 0.34 0.33 0.85 0.42 0.47
Maximum	Time	Detectable	(!s) 3000 1500 3000 1500 1500 3000
Minimum	Time	Detectable	(!s) 5 5 5 5 5 5
30	dB-Hz45	dB-Hz
Victim	C/No
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tt
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Table 5.9: Comparison results with Detection Method 2. The results corresponds when 6 satellites are
present in the signal.
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5.3 Receiver Operation Characteristic (ROC)
In this section the Receiver Operation Characteristic (ROC) for some of the most significant
cases of the Detection method 1 is depicted, although it could be also done for the other one.
The ROC will be depicted for the three di↵erent attack strategies carried out. First of all, we
need to specify what is the ROC, and what it represents. Figure 5.1 shows an example of ROC.
In the ROC is plotted the probability of Detection (PD) versus the probability of False Alarm
(PFA). Each point on the blue curve corresponds to a certain value (PD) and (PFA), for a given
threshold γ. Figure 5.1 shows as the threshold γ increases (we move towards zero in the curve),
(PFA) and (PD) decreases. In addition, the ROC should always be above the dashed 45 deg
line. This is because the dashed line represents a detector that bases its decisions in chance,
ignoring all data. The ROC should always be above the black 45deg dashed line. This dashed
line corresponds to the chance detector, that bases its decision on flipping a coin and ignoring
all data.
A metric to measure the test’s discriminative ability (how good is the test in a given situation)
from the ROC curve is the Area Under the Curve, or just AUROC. This AUROC is plotted
in Figure 5.1 in transparent-blue. The AUROC is equal to the probability that a randomly
chosen positive event ranks above (is deemed to have a higher probability of being positive
than) a randomly chosen negative event. Or in other words, AUROC determines how good
is the detector summarizing its performance in a single value, in order to be able to compare
between detector easily. The perfect detector AUROC is 1, and the AUROC for the worse
detector, which is the chance detector, is 0.5. The AUROC values can be classified as
AUROC Classification
[0.9	,	1) Excellent
[0.8	,	0.9) Good
[0.7	,	0.8) Fair
[0.6	,	0.7) Poor
[0.5	,	0.6) Bad
Table 5.10: Classification of the AUROC values depending on the detector performance.
In the next Section are plotted some ROC curves from the results shown in Section ??. In
the plotted curves has been only considered the cases when 6 satellites are present, since it is
the worst case scenario considered (in terms of number of PRN codes present in the signal). In
addition, only the cases when the victim C/No level is 45 dB-Hz and 35 dB-Hz has been taken
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into account. This is done only to show the behaviour of the detector in two typical outdoor
C/No levels. Moreover, the ROC curves corresponds to the best window length for each attack.
5.3.1 ROC Comparison
In Figure 5.2 the ROC curves for the three attacks are plotted when the spoofer C/No is 45
dB-Hz. The performance of the detectors shows that in general are quite poor, above all for
the Chip-By-Chip Estimation and Bit-Guess Estimation attacks, since the AUROC in these
cases is about 0.5. This means that the detectors in those circumstances will behave practically
as a chance detector. In this case due to the high spoofer C/No, the attacker will estimate
the real symbol very quickly, and therefore the transmitted bit will be modified very little. In
consequence, the victim will not be able to determine the spoofer presence with enough certainty.
This bad results for these attacks were expected, since looking at the cases when the spoofer
C/No is 45 dB-Hz in Tables 5.2 and 5.3 the results were not too much propitious. In contrast,
Table 5.4 shows quite good results against FEA attack, with an AUROC of about 0.6. According
to the classification given at the beginning of the Section, the detectors for the attacks Chip-
By-Chip Estimation and Bit-Guess Estimation are considered bad detectors, since its AUROC
is comprised in the range of [0.50, 0.60). The detector for the FEA attack is considered a Poor
detector, since the AUROC is comprised in the range [0.60, 0.70).
In Figure 5.3 the ROC curves when the spoofer C/No is 40 dB-Hz are depicted. In this
γ -
γ
Figure 5.1: ROC example for the case of a Gaussian distribution.
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L
 = 0.9 s, AUC = 0.51
Attack 3, Victim C/No = 45 dB-Hz, W
L
 = 3.7 s, AUC = 0.62
Attack 3, Victim C/No = 35 dB-Hz, W
L
 = 3.7 s, AUC = 0.62
Figure 5.2: ROC for the three attacks when the spoofer C/No is 45 dB and victim C/No levels of 45
dB-Hz and 35 dB-Hz.
case, as we have seen, the spoofer needed more time (approximately three times) to estimate
correctly the received bit from the satellite. In consequence, the victim has more time to detect
the spoofer, and the detection results are improved. Looking at Figure 5.3 we can observe as
all the behaviour of all the plotted detectors is similar. All of them have an AUROC of about
0.6-0.7. Comparing the obtained ROC results with Tables 5.4, 5.4 and 5.4 we could say that
both results concur in that the detector can be considered a poor detector, according to the
classification given above.
In Figure 5.4 the ROC curves when the spoofer C/No is 40 dB-Hz are depicted. In this case
is shown as all the curves for all the attacks are very similar between them. The AUROC for the
full amount of detectors is comprised in the range of [0.70, 0.80). According to the classification
given above the detectors could be considered fair detectors. From this point, we start to obtain
quite good detectors. This is mainly due to the fact that the spoofer needs a quite large amount
of time (about 36.7µs) to estimate the symbol coming from the satellite.
Finally, in Figure 5.5 the ROC curves when the spoofer C/No is 30 dB-Hz is depicted. Figure
5.5 shows a great improvement compared with the other cases. Above all compared with the
cases of C/No 45 dB-Hz and 40 dB-Hz. In this occasion the AUROC are higher than 0.75 in any
case. The best performance is obtained against the attack strategy Chip-By-Chip Estimation.
The AUROC values for this case is 0.84 and 0.95, for 45 dB-Hz and 35 dB-Hz respectively. This
means that the detector can be classified as an excellent detector (45 dB-Hz) or a good detector
(35 dB-Hz), depending on the victim C/No, according to the classification given above. The
detector against the attack strategy Bit-Guess Estimation is the worse of the three, although the
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Figure 5.3: ROC for the three attacks when he spoofer C/No is 40 dB and victim C/No levels of 45
dB-Hz and 35 dB-Hz.
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Figure 5.4: ROC for the three attacks when the spoofer C/No is 35 dB and victim C/No levels of 45
dB-Hz and 35 dB-Hz.
5.3. Receiver Operation Characteristic (ROC) 69
AUROC is between 0.6-0.7. Thus, in this case the detector behaves as a poor detector. Finally,
the detector performance against the FEA attack can be classified as a good detector, since the
obtained AUROC is very close to 0.8 or even beyond that value.
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Figure 5.5: ROC for the three attacks when the spoofer C/No is 30 dB and victim C/No levels of 45
dB-Hz and 35 dB-Hz.

6 Conclusions
The main purpose of this thesis was to show that attacks against GNSS are feasible and it could
have disastrous consequences, since critical systems of our society relies partially or totally on
GNSS. First of all, we have provided an introduction about GNSS, in which we have described in
what consists GNSS, the segments by which it is composed, its deployment architecture and the
GNSS signals and receiver architecture. This outline on GNSS has been useful to understand
the state-of-the-art attacks described in Chapter 3. In this Chapter, some attacks against
GNSS proposed in the literature has been described. Then, the strategies used to perform the
attacks in this thesis has been fully described. They were split in two approaches. The first one,
consisted in the estimation of the real bit transmitted by the satellite, and the rebroadcast of this
estimation. By means of this approach, the received signal by the victim had some instabilities
at the beginning of some bits or the sign of the beginning and ending of each symbol were
di↵erent, produced by the estimation process of the unpredictable bits. The second one, the
FEA attack, consisted in predicting somehow the bits of the Navigation Data, or obtaining them
from other source since some of the information provided by the Navigation Message is public.
Some bits are unpredictable, so the spoofer needed to guess them. Some of the guesses were
wrong, and the spoofer increased the amplitude of the first samples after each wrong guess in
order to maintain the same bit energy as if the signal were the authentic.
After describing the attacks, the di↵erent proposed detection techniques were described.
They basically consisted in computing the ratio between the first and last part of the bits, but
following di↵erent approaches (taking into account the sign, energy, etc.). After showing them,
they were applied against real recorded signals in di↵erent conditions of C/No. Some signals
where authentic, and some other were modified to simulate the spoofer attack. Then the results
against both type of signals were compared in order to decide if the victim could determine the
spoofer presence.
From the results shown in Chapter 5 can be drawn the following conclusions:
1. All the proposed attack strategies can be detected by some method. The performance of
the proposed detection methods is strongly dependant on the spoofer and victim C/No
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level, as well as the observation window length carried out by the victim.
2. The lower the C/No at the spoofer, the more time it needs to estimate the bits transmitted
by the satellite. Therefore, the victim will be able to detect the attacker with a wider
observation window length due to the wider tell-tale. Thus the victim will have more
freedom degrees to apply during the detection process.
3. When the victim C/No worsens, the victim has more di culties to detect the spoofer. The
noise in the signal conceals the remaining e↵ects produced by the modifications carried
out by the attacker.
4. The number of satellites present in the signal is not determining in the detection perfor-
mance. The cross-correlation e↵ect produced by the presence of more PRN sequences ends
up with an increment of about 0.1-0.2.
5. The best observation window length that the victim can choose is directly related to the
number of samples that are modified by the spoofer. Therefore, the optimal window length
is strongly dependant on the spoofer C/No. Depending on the attack nature, this optimal
window length can be equal to the number of modified samples or two times this value.
For example, for the attack strategies Chip-By-Chip Estimation and FEA, the optimal
length is equal to the number of samples the spoofer modifies. When the victim takes
only the number of samples modified by the spoofer, the di↵erence between the first and
last samples is maximum (the samples are balanced out one each other, or is taken the
full samples with increased amplitude), and therefore the ratio is minimum (or maximum
in the case of the FEA attack). On the contrary, the optimal length for the Bit-Guess
Estimation is two times the samples that are modified, since the minimum ratio occurs
when the guess and the true symbol cancels completely (after switching the polarity of the
bit when the guess is wrong).
6. The proposed detection methods behaves better against some of the attacks than against
the others. The best detection performance is obtained against FEA attack, which is the
attack that modifies the most the signal, increasing amplitude of the first samples of the
bit the most. On its behalf, the detection performance against the Chip-By-Chip and Bit-
Guess Estimation strategies was quite similar. Although the attack Bit-Guess Estimation
shows that the spoofer was better concealed, and thus the detection methods were more
e↵ective against attack 1, above all at low victim C/No.
In terms of best absolute performance of the proposed methods, we could say that in
general terms the best detection method is obtained with the Total Correlation Ratio
Detection Technique, specially at low spoofer C/No. At high spoofer C/No the di↵erences
are reduced, and the performance for all the detection techniques is quite similar. When
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the spoofer C/No is high enough, in general the performance is more dependant on the
victim C/No than in the detection method carried out.
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